Incidence, Settlement and Resolution of Patent Litigation Suits in Germany by Cremers, Katrin
Incidence, Settlement and Resolution of
Patent Litigation Suits in Germany
Inauguraldissertation
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
der Universita¨t Mannheim
vorgelegt von
Katrin Cremers
Su¨dring 35
67281 Bissersheim
Referent:
Prof. Konrad Stahl, Ph.D.,
Lehrstuhl fu¨r Volkswirtschaftslehre, insb. Angewandte Mikroo¨konomik,
Universita¨t zu Mannheim
Koreferent:
Prof. Dietmar Harhoff, Ph.D.,
Institut fu¨r Innovationsforschung,
Technologiemanagement und Entrepreneurship,
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t Mu¨nchen
Mannheim, 20.02.2007
II
Referent: Prof. Konrad Stahl, Ph.D.
Koreferent: Prof. Dietmar Harhoff, Ph.D.
Abteilungssprecher: Prof. Dr. Enno Mammen
Tag der mu¨ndlichen Pru¨fung: 18. Oktober 2006
Acknowledgements
This collection of articles represents my doctoral thesis submitted to the department
of economics at the University of Mannheim, Germany. I am deeply indebted to my
supervisor Konrad Stahl who supported my work with precious ideas, critical and
constructive comments as well as motivating remarks. Dietmar Harhoff deserves
special thanks for guiding me through the economics of patents. He supported me
with invaluable, inspiring discussions, beneficial comments and constant amicable
support. Moreover, I would like to thank Bronwyn Hall for her permanent interest
in my work and her critical and encouraging comments, especially on the first part
of this thesis. I am grateful to Georg Licht who furthered my work and undertak-
ings throughout the time I worked on this thesis with both inspiring discussions
and friendly encouragement. Furthermore I am thankful to numerous conference
participants at the EARIE, EPIP, IIOC and VfS in Amsterdam, Munich, Boston
and Zurich for comments and ideas at previous stages of this research.
This work is based on unique data from the District Courts in Mannheim and
Du¨sseldorf as well on data from the German Patent Office and the European Patent
Office. I gratefully acknowledge the support of these institutions. Thorsten Do-
herr and Ju¨rgen Moka helped to set up the large patent and company data sets.
Furthermore, I thank the research assistants at the ZEW, Krisitiane Engel, Sascha
Karrassek, Jan Sauermann, Tobias Veith and Martin Werner, for making the data
available in electronic form and for a large amount of data cleaning work. Stefan
Wagner from the university of Munich provided excellent support in setting up the
European patent data. A large part of the editorial work was friendly supported by
Andrew Flower.
Financial support for the research presented in this thesis and related research
was provided by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under grant SFB/TR 15-04.
III
IV
I am grateful for that.
I am appreciative to my colleagues and friends at ZEW, in particular, Birgit As-
chhoff, Gu¨nther Ebling, Thomas Hempell, Norbert Janz, Bettina Peters and Helmut
Fryges for their aid and for creating a friendly working atmosphere. For helpful dis-
cussions in the doctoral seminars at the University of Mannheim I am indebted to
Patrick Beschorner, Elisabeth Mu¨ller, Martin Peitz and Thomas Roende. Susanne
Prantl and Alexandra Spitz deserve special thanks, not only for the discussions, but
also for their continuous encouragement. I thank my parents who have supported
me all through my life. Finally, precious thanks go to my husband Carsten and my
children, Katharina and Moritz, for their patient love and confidence in me.
Contents
1 General Introduction 1
2 The German System of Patent Litigation 7
3 Data on Patent Litigation in Germany 12
3.1 Court Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 Publicly Available Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.3 Creation of the Control Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4 Determinants of Patent Suit Filings in Germany 17
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.2 Theoretical Considerations on Parties’ Decision to Litigate or to Settle . . . 20
4.2.1 Prior Research and Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2.2 Hypotheses on the Determinants of Patent Litigation Filing . . . . . 25
4.3 Sample Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.3.1 Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.4 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.4.2 Results from Probit Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.6 Appendix Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
I
CONTENTS II
5 Settlement During Patent Trials 57
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.2 Theoretical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.2.1 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.2.2 Previous Empirical Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.3 Variables and Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.4 Empirical Specification and Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.4.1 General Choice of Settlement During Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.4.2 Settlement at Different Stages During Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.6 Appendix Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6 Determinants of the Duration of Patent Trials 93
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.2 Theoretical and Institutional Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.2.1 Duration of Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.2.2 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.2.3 Court Delays and Procedural Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.4 Competing Risk Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.4.1 Econometric Model and Estimation Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.4.2 Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
List of Tables
4.1 Descriptive Statistics for all Exogenous Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2 Forward Citation in EPO and DPMA by Litigated and Non-Litigated Patents 34
4.3 Backward Citation in EPO and DPMA by Litigated and Non-Litigated
Patents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.4 Distribution of Patents Across Technical Areas, by Litigated and Non-
Litigated Patents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.5 Age of Patents at Time of Filing in the Sample of Litigated Patents . . . . 41
4.6 Probability of Litigation by Ownership and Forward Citations . . . . . . . . 43
4.7 Probability of Litigation by Portfolio Size and Firm Size of the Patentee . . 44
4.8 Probit Estimation Specification: Probability of Patent Litigation . . . . . . 46
4.9 Probit Estimation Specification: Probability of Patent Litigation Using
Patent Portfolio Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.10 Conversion Factors to Estimate Population Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . . 53
5.1 Course of the Case in Mannheim and Du¨sseldorf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.2 Settlement Rates by Technical Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.3 Plaintiff Win Rates by Technical Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.4 Description of Exogenous Variables by Stage of Settlement, Means (SD) . . 71
5.5 Probit Estimation of Settlement in Patent Suits with Sample Selection Cor-
rection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.6 Probit Estimation of Timing of Settlement - Marginal Effects . . . . . . . . 81
III
LIST OF TABLES IV
A5.1 Definition of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
A5.2 Probit Estimation of Timing of Settlement - Estimation Coefficients . . . . 89
A5.3 Ordered Probit Estimation of Timing of Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.1 Time Length of Suits by Kind of Termination and District Court . . . . . 102
6.2 Description of Main Exogenous Variables According to Type of
Termination, Mean (SD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.3 Hazard Rate Model Estimates by Kind of Suit Termination . . . . 108
List of Figures
4.1 General Structure of a Patent Infringement Dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1 Detailed Structure of an Infringement Dispute and Sample Description . . . 61
6.1 Baseline Hazard Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
V
Chapter 1
General Introduction
National patent systems (NPS) are relatively mature institutions: they were in-
stalled in the U.S. in the late 18th century and in several European countries during
the 19th century. Controversy about their efficiency continues to motivate economic
research, however. The fundamental issue is well understood: The investment in-
centives created by NPS are to some extent offset by the creation of a monopoly-like
situation and the price and quantity constraints which such monopolies impose on
the market. The one-size-fits-all patent length for patents of different levels of qual-
ity and technology fails to provide the appropriate additional benefits which would
be necessary to compensate patentees for research and development expenditures
and consequently distorts the inherent incentive effects of patents. A particularly
egregious example is the enforcement of patent rights on life saving drugs in devel-
oping countries.1 However, even leaving its dynamic aspects to one side, the patent
system in its current form also entails the dilemma discussed by Lemley and Shapiro
(2004): “Uncertainty, then, is endemic in the patent system. ... They (patents) are
government grants of an entitlement to enforce a legal right ”. This means that,
although the safeguarding and enforcement of property rights are essential for in-
vestment, trade and eventually for economic growth, patents are far from ironclad
property rights.2 Their limits of validity have to be enforced when facing potential
infringing actions. This pattern is especially important for predominantly intangible
intellectual property rights which by definition constitute the most dynamic strate-
1For this problem solutions are discussed by Lanjouw (2003), Scherer (2004).
2See Djankov et al. (2003).
1
2gic asset: productive knowledge– a problem that has been widely recognized in the
economic and law research literature and which has also attracted the attention of
policy makers.3
Within the European Union there is a vital discussion going on about the design
of the European Patent System and consequently about the enforcement system.
The patentability of software patents, gene and genetic discoveries is still not finally
decided. In addition, there are detailed planes about creating a European Commu-
nity patent. The aim of creating such a Community patent is to give inventors the
option of obtaining a single patent which is legally valid throughout the European
Union. The expected advantages of this system are a substantial reduction in patent-
ing costs, particularly those relating to translation and filing, a simplified protection
of inventions throughout the territory of the EU thanks to a single procedure, the
establishment of a single centralized system of litigation. The creation of a Commu-
nity patent system remains a sensitive issue as this dossier is still deadlocked after 13
years of discussions by European decision-makers. Two main reasons of this block-
ing occur. First, the countries would like to keep the patent authorities (the patent
offices) in force and maintain their own special characteristics of patent enforcement
system. Second, the establishment of a unique enforcement system in the sense of
one central patent court creates a number of technical and jurisdictional problems
which seems hardly to be solve. One of these problems is the language in which the
patent suits should be handled. Another controversially discussed feature is the pro-
cedure of the litigation suit. There are special characteristics such as discovery and
preliminary injunctions which are differently organized in the EU member states.
The experiences of the various European enforcement systems should be evaluated
and taken into account when shaping a European Patent system.
This thesis offers a unique empirical investigation of the enforcement of German
patent rights. It contains three essays on various aspects of patent litigation in
Germany and adds empirical evidence to the existing literature, most of which is
built on large data sets for the United States. Lanjouw and Schankerman (1997,
2001, 2003), for example, have shed light on the general mechanism of patent right
enforcement in the U.S. To date, however, relatively little research has focused on
Germany. The investigation of patent litigation in the German patent system is
3See Andersen (2004).
3interesting owing to certain important features which distinguish it from the U.S.
system. First, for Germany there is an estimated litigation rate of about 1 percent
of all patents in force at any given time. In contrast, Lanjouw and Schankerman
(2003) estimate a probability of a patent suit being filed of about 2.1 per cent for
the United States. Twice as many patent lawsuits per patent are therefore pursued
in the US than in Germany. This is particularly interesting from an analytical point
of view bearing in mind the lower legal costs borne by litigating parties in Germany
where we would therefore, ceteris paribus, expect the litigation rate to be higher.
Second, in contrast to the patents analyzed for the U.S., the type of German patents
analyzed in this thesis are subject to the European and German system of applying
for and granting patents. Third, the enforcement of patents is strictly separated
into infringement disputes where the validity of the patent is not questioned and
invalidity suits which are filed at a different court.
Each patent suit is unique in its merits, since patents are by definition new and
unique to the market. Thus, the infringing action is not defined in prior trials.
This differentiates these suits markedly from other civil disputes such as automo-
tive accidents or medical malpractice trials. Furthermore, as legal enforcement of
patent rights depends crucially on the judicial system I introduce the German patent
system and its enforcement mechanism in Chapter 2. As already noted, German
patents, when they are applied for at the European Patent Office (EPO), are sub-
ject to the European patent system. In most cases this means that they are valid
in more than one European country. Another difference between the German and
American patent enforcement systems is the existence of an opposition procedure
in the German system which introduces a form of quality control after a patent has
been granted.4 Opposition procedures are regarded as the first legal test of patent
validity and can be filed by any third party. All three essays consider the impact on
the enforcement system of this distinctive feature of the German patent system.
All essays draw on the same unique data set which was collected by the author
using information retrieved from written court files as part of an ongoing procedure.
The data set contains all patent litigation suits filed from 1993 to 1995 at two of
the three main District Courts in Germany which have jurisdictional responsibility
for disputes relating to intellectual property rights. 715 litigation cases involving
4See Graham et al. (2003) for discussion
4more than 900 patents were identified for this time period. Detailed information
about the course of the case as well as patent characteristics from various different
data bases have been merged to the patentee data. Chapter 3 includes a detailed
description of the database.
In Chapter 4, I estimate the determinants of patent litigation at the two District
Courts in Mannheim and Du¨sseldorf. I analyze the probability of litigation as a
function of a set of exogenous variables which reflect characteristics of the patent,
market conditions, and characteristics of the patent owner. As one of the main
results, I find a significant higher probability of litigation for patents which are more
valuable than the average. Small firms are more often involved in patent litigation
suits than larger ones which points to the high relative value the litigated patent
has for small companies compared to larger ones. Contrary to results for the U.S., I
did not find that individual patentees are more likely to be involved in patent suits.
These results have direct implications for the calculation of risk based litigation
insurance fees, of the type planned in the EU. In addition, Chapter 4 contributes to
the existing literature by providing evidence of a positive relationship between the
incidence of opposition procedures and the probability of litigation. One potential
reason for this result is that opposition is more likely to high valuable patents which,
in turn, are more likely to be litigated. This result contributes to the discussion in the
U.S. about whether installing an opposition system there would lead to qualitatively
more valuable patents and, hence, to a lower probability of involvement in litigation
and challenge suits.
Chapter 5 extends the analysis of Chapter 4 to consider the reasons why trials,
which are themselves generally the outcome of a failure to reach settlement during
pre-trial negotiations, nonetheless often result in settlements. I look at the settle-
ment decision at various stages of the trial: before the hearing, after the hearing,
at first appeal (after court decision at the District Court). Most models explaining
pre-trial negotiations neglect the multi-stage structure of these negotiation processes
and conclude the analysis with the decision about whether to settle or to litigate.
The empirical analysis of Chapter 5 aims at closing this gap. The results suggest
that, at the time of litigation, almost all available information is used to decide
whether to file a suit or not. Additional information evolving in the course of time,
for example because of annulment suits, influence the pattern of settlement at later
5stages of the trial. The results suggest that the legal environment exerts a pow-
erful influence on the settlement decision at each stage of the trial. The general
settlement rate not only differs considerably between the District Courts, but also
at each stage of the trial. The decision to settle at a higher stage is not related to
the outcome of adjudication at lower stages. The overall conclusion of the analysis
in this Chapter is that, at each stage, the decision to settle is made independently
of the preceding decision.
The results from Chapter 5 lead directly to the key issue dealt with in Chapter 6.
This Chapter sheds light on how the duration of trials is determined: the speciality
of the infringing action may result in efforts being made to terminate the suit, or
its duration may be affected by the general characteristics of the patent or of the
patentee. In particular, I tackle the question of whether the outcome of a patent
litigation suit is influenced directly by the efforts the litigant undertake in order
to terminate a legal patent dispute. This analysis goes one important step further
than the existing literature by using detailed information about the course of the
case. I particularly take the means of defense into consideration: filing an annulment
suit, the procedural details of a hearing and requests of suspension. Existing work
concentrates on duration investigations in areas of civil law other than intellectual
property rights (car accidents and medical malpractice suits). In this body of the
literature evidence on infringement is solely based on standardized infringement
actions. The property rights there are well defined in the sense that, similar to the
U.S. patent system, opposition and annulment procedures are not available as legal
means. The results of this Chapter reveal that annulment suits as a means of defense
of the potential infringer delays court adjudication but not settlement in German
patent litigation suits. Only if suspension is requested is the hazard of termination
of both types of patent suit termination decreased. The results suggest that courts
are experienced in handling complex litigation claims and expert reports. They
therefore do not delay decisions. A large number of originally filed patent claims
lowers the hazard of court adjudication, however.
This Chapter is the first study to provide an investigation of settlement decisions
in patent infringement suits for Germany. For the German patent system which is
part of the European patent system an investigation of the settlement pattern during
trials could illuminate some problems to be solved in developing a new European
patent court. While patents applied for at the European Patent Office (EPO) are
6valid in all countries named on the application enforcement is still the responsibility
of the national judical systems. According to the European Commission plans the
enforcement of a future Community Patent will be put into the hands of a European
Patent Court. A detailed discussion of the advantages and draw backs of various
plans is discussed in Luginbuehl (2003). In order to create an efficient European
patent enforcement system and to avoid high costs and uncertainty a systematic
research of the course of patent cases within the national systems may support the
development of this planned European patent court. Similar to the U.S. I find
that jurisdictional and strategic factors rather than economic values determine the
probability of settlement or non-settlement.5
5Settlement rates at certain stages of the suit differ considerably between national legal systems.
Lanjouw and Schankerman (2003) report trial settlement rates of more than 90% in the U.S. For
Germany those rates are only about 55% on average (Stauder, 1989).
Chapter 2
The German System of Patent
Litigation
A patent can be subject to litigation before a German District Court if it is valid
in Germany. The original application may have been filed at the German Patent
Office, as a Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) patent or at the European Patent
Office, with Germany as the designated state in the latter cases. Before 1976 patent
protection for Germany was only available at the DPMA, which received all ap-
plications. DPMA examiners conducted searchs and examinations. On average,
37% of the applications resulted in a German patent grant.1 The requirements for
patentability of an invention are novelty, inventive activity, and commercial appli-
cability (§ 1, German Patent Act). An invention is regarded as “novel” if it is not
state of the prior art. An invention is the result of inventive activity if the activity
is not obvious to an expert on the state of the prior art (§§ 3 and 4, German Patent
Act).2 If the examination of a patent application reveals novelty, inventive activ-
1This calculation is based on the application and granting information published by the DPMA
Annual reports from 1977 to 2000). There is a large variation among the years. Patent applications
submitted in the late 1980s to the mid-1990s had an average granting probability of more than
40%, starting at 36 percent in 1978 and increasing to 48 percent in 1989. From 1995 to 1999 the
granting rate decreased to 23 percent.
2In Germany, it is possible to apply for a petty patent or registration right. These intellectual
property rights have lower requirements for the inventive step (§ 1, Registration Right Act). In
contrast to the inventive activity necessary for a regular patent grant, the inventive step for a
registration right requires a less detailed examination. However, the same enforcement rules apply
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8ity and commercial applicability and the formal requirements of the application are
fulfilled, the patent right will be granted.
In 1978 the PCT entered into force.3 A PCT application allows an applicant
to file one international application (“international phase”) in a process to seek
patent protection in multiple contracting states named in the application (“National
Phase”). A PCT application can be filed up to twelve months after the priority date
and is submitted to the relevant national patent office or to the European office (Art.
10 PCT). Art. 15 PCT specifies how the first international search is to be conducted.
The advantages of PCT applications are that the applicant files one application –
the international application – in one place and in one language, paying one initial
set of fees; this international application also has the effect of a national or regional
application. Without the PCT, the applicant would have to file separately for each
country. In addition, at the beginning of a patent’s life – the “international phase”
– its applicant does not face all of the translation costs and application fees at once.
They are due when the application enters its respective “national phase”.4
At the same time, in 1978, the European Patent Organization started working ac-
tively with the European Patent Office (EPO) in Munich.5 The European procedure
for patent application, examination, and granting is very similar to the Germany.
At the applicant’s formal request, an examination concerning the novelty and inven-
tive step determines whether the prerequisites for patentability are fulfilled (Art 92,
European Patent Convention, EPC). The examination report is a formal statement
of the legal executive authority and serves as the basis for the granting decision. A
European application names the member states in which patent protection is sought.
In those designated states, a European patent grant becomes a national right.
Both the European and German patent systems provide the opportunity to op-
to these IPRs as to regular patents.
3The PCT is a multilateral treaty that was concluded in Washington in 1970. It is administered
by the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), whose head-
quarters are in Geneva (Switzerland). As of the beginning of 2004, PCT patents can be applied
for in 123 contracting states.
4See Thumm for a comprehensive description of IPR systems.
5The European Patent Office grants European patents for the contracting states to the Euro-
pean Patent Convention, which was signed in Munich on 5 October 1973 and entered into force on
7 October 1977.
9pose a patent grant, although the post–granting time frames differ. These requests
are decided upon by specialized opposition boards at the patent offices (Art. 99,
European Patent Act; § 59, German Patent Act).6 In Germany, invalidity suits
as well as appeals against decisions on opposition are heard by the Federal Patent
Court in Munich (§ 81, German Patent Act).
Annulment suits are also part of the patent system. According to § 82, German
Patent Act, an annulment suit has to be filed at the the Federal Patent Court.
European patent grants for Germany become regular German patent rights. This
means that annulment suits against these grants must be filed at the German Federal
Patent Court. For patents valid for the German market, issues of infringement
and license disputes are left to the specialized District Courts of civil law. These
issues are completely separate from questions of patent validity. If property rights
are in force, they are civil rights and infringements are dealt with under civil law.
Enforcement procedures, such as infringement or license disputes, must be brought
before the relevant District Court of first instance. Patents are presumed to be valid
by the judges involved. As von Meibom and Pitz (1996) point out, the German
District Courts have “no power to revoke the patent or to alter the claims of the
patent.” The jurisdictional responsibility for patent infringement cases lies with 13
District Courts in Germany. More than 80% of all cases in Germany are covered by
the District Courts in Du¨sseldorf, Munich, and Mannheim. Hamburg, Frankfurt and
Braunschweig also have considerable experience despite the relatively small number
of cases filed in these cities. The plaintiff has a very free hand when it comes to
choosing the legal venue and can either sue at the infringer’s domestic business
location or in the jurisdictional area where the infringement took place. A potential
plaintiff will therefore search for a forum where he or she expects to be awarded the
highest damages and/or where the chances of winning the case are greatest. This
”forum shopping” is also influenced by differences in the technical qualifications and
experience of judges at various District Courts.
The general course of patent infringement suits is determined by the German
Code of Civil Procedure. Detailed elements of the course of the suit can differ from
one District Court to the next with respect to the time table of actions, and this is
6Opposition to a granted German patent must be filed within three months of the grant’s an-
nouncement (§ 59 German Patent Act). For a European patent, third–party opposition is possible
up to nine months after the patent grant is published (Art. 99, European Patent Convention).
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another reason for forum shopping. An IPR case starts when the plaintiff issues a
statement of claim including the names of the parties, the details of the infringing
action, and the particulars of the property right in question. The statement of
claim also specifies the remedy requested, including all costs and damages. The
court serves the statement of claim to the defendant, who then has an opportunity
to respond to the allegation. A common means of defense is to present a nullity
claim or an opposition which is often combined with a request to postpone the
litigation procedure.7 The court anticipates the probable outcome of these means of
defense and decide whether the legal procedure should be postponed until the Federal
Patent Court or the DPMA has decided on the validity of the patent. Evidence is
derived mainly from documents, witnesses, and independent experts. The parties are
legally bound to deliver all relevant information; there is no discovery, however. The
plaintiff in particular is required to exercise due diligence in fully investigating the
potential infringement. If the parties are unable to come to a settlement agreement,
the judge orders an oral hearing and renders a judgement. The judgement is either
condemnation or partial condemnation of the defendant according to the plaintiff’s
requests or a dismissal of the lawsuit. In case of condemnation, possible remedies
include the issue of an injunction, accounting for unlawful profits, or damages. The
infringer is then obliged to refrain from continuing the infringing action, provide all
necessary information for calculation of the damages and eventually pay them.8
In urgent cases and where there is a risk of substantial and irreparable losses,
the patentee may apply for a preliminary injunction (§§ 934 and 940, German Code
of Civil Procedure). This must be done promptly as soon as the infringement has
been detected.9 The patentee is also required to issue a clear statement that such
an urgent injunction would prevent him or her from suffering large losses. If the
injunction is granted, the infringer will be required to refrain from continuing his or
7Case evidence shows that an opposition or a nullity suit is filed as a means of defense in
around 50 percent of cases. See von Meibom and Pitz (1996) for further procedural details.
8Usually, judges declare all remedies. But it can be that only condemnation is declared, or
damages without accounting have to be paid.
9Urgency is assumed by the courts only if the plaintiff files for preliminary injunction without
undue delay after obtaining knowledge of an infringement. The undue delay is subject to inter-
pretation. The Munich I District Court considers longer than four weeks undue, and all other
patent District Courts consider more than six months. See Pitz (1999) and Marshall (2000)for
more details.
11
her infringing activities (§ 139 German Patent Act).10
Two types of expenses are relevant in most cases: court costs and attorney costs.
Both are strongly related to the jurisdictional value of the case, which is set by the
court after the letter of claims is filed. The court estimates the jurisdictional value
considering the value of the invention and the size of the parties involved.11. The
judge takes into account a fairly rough estimate of the patent holder’s recorded sales
with the patented invention. Both court costs and recoverable attorney expenses
depend on the jurisdictional value based on a fee schedule. According to the appli-
cable British rule, the losing party must pay all of the winning party’s court costs,
recoverable attorney costs, and expertise expenses as well as its own expenses.
10See Ko¨rner (1984).
11See Stauder (1989), p. 62.
Chapter 3
Data on Patent Litigation in
Germany
3.1 Court Data Collection
My empirical analysis of patent litigation cases drew on a database extracted from
files contained in court archives. Computerized data on general or specifically
patent-related litigation are not available in Germany. All large District Courts
with specialized chambers for IPR suits1 were solicited for access to their archives.
The judges at the courts in Du¨sseldorf and Mannheim agreed to provide access to
their written case records.
I chose the filing years 1993-1995 at the courts for two reasons. First, I tried to
collect as many cases for a single cohort as possible. Since the archives only contain
records of finished cases and since the average duration of suits is about 6.5 years I
had to choose suits which were mostly closed at the time of data collection in 1999
and 2000.2 Second, I needed to choose these filing cohorts to be not so far removed
chronologically as to prevent the matching of comprehensive information about the
parties and the patents with information from other databases.3 Virtually all cases
1Mannheim, Du¨sseldorf, Munich, Frankfurt
2Stauder (1989) found that more than 60 percent of patent and utility cases are finished within
their second year and 95% after six years.
3A cohort contains patents with the same year of application.
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filed at both District Courts during this period of time are included within the data
set. When I assume that there is no significant change of the distribution of case
filings among the District Courts compared to the data of Stauder (1989) then I
covered around 60% of all cases filed in Germany during this period of time, missing
mainly the suits treated in Munich. Data was collected from May to July 1999 in
Mannheim and from October 1999 to February 2000 in Du¨sseldorf.
Even though the chambers at the District Courts are specialized, they hear a
wide range of different legal cases - disputes relating to general contracts, license
suits, and IPR cases including patents, utility patents, copyrights, and trademarks.
For IPR cases, infringement is just one topic of legal disputes; all kinds of contract
issues must be decided on. It was therefore necessary to identify the patent and
utility infringement cases among all cases filed at those chambers. For the pur-
pose of this research, I chose the legal rights of patents and utility patents because
they are relatively strong compared to trademarks and copyrights and they identify
technological inventions based on R&D efforts. The procedures for legal disputes
on infringement are very similar for both types of property right. The subject line
on the front page of the files served as the main indicator: I searched for words
and phrases such as ”patent,” ”patent infringement,” ”utility patent,” ”injunction,”
”preliminary injunction,” ”presentation of accounts,” ”license agreement,” and ”em-
ployee invention.” The first screening revealed about 950 cases of infringement. A
second screening, reading the statement of claim and the defendant’s responses, dis-
closed whether the subject matter really related to an infringing action. I restricted
myself to unambiguous cases of patent and utility infringements. For the analysis, I
included both requests for preliminary injunction and regular filings in the investiga-
tion. I discarded all suits regarding disputes over license contracts, legal arguments
about compensation for employees’ inventions, and other patent and utility patent
cases which did not concern infringements. After the second screening 715 infringe-
ment cases were left within the sample. By definition of jurisdictional responsibility,
challenge suits are not treated at the District Courts. However, there are suits deal-
ing with license disputes where patent claims and license contracts are in question,
suits dealing with unauthorized warnings against infringers who actually have not
infringed, and suits dealing with advertising with patent rights which are not ac-
tually covered by patent claims. These types are similar to challenge suits but are
heard by the civil courts; for this reason I retained them within the data set. For the
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third step of the detailed investigation, 715 cases of pure patent or utility litigation
had to be screened meticulously. The correspondence of the parties, including the
statement of claims and the response of the defendant, was checked. This process
yielded information about the requested claims and the arguments of the parties.
The court decisions and rulings revealed the outcome and the costs of the cases.
The information extracted from the written case files was divided into three main
categories: the proceedings of the suit, the parties, and the patent at issue. The
first category covers a brief description of the stages of the infringement case. It
includes the dates of the filing, the oral hearing, and the ruling. Almost all case
files reported the outcomes, including the outcomes of any first and second appeals.
Cost figures were also collected, with paid damages added to the costs. The second
category covers the names and the locations of the parties involved in the trials. At
least one party was located within the jurisdiction of the court. The third category
covers information on the patents involved, such as the age of the patent at time of
filing as well as the field of technology (IPC).
The two courts differ in terms of the amount of detailed patent data recorded. In
Mannheim, the records normally include the patent document or disclosure as well
as witnesses’ documents and experts reports. At the District Court in Du¨sseldorf,
only the statement of claim, the subsequent correspondence between the parties and
the court, and the judgement of the court are kept in the permanent files. I divided
the information extracted from the written case files into three main categories: the
proceedings of the suit, the parties, and the patent at issue. In order to complete the
information about the patents involved in the disputes, data from PATDPA, which
is an official database of the German Patent Office (DPA) and one of the EPO’s
databases, EPOLINE, were added.4
4As mentioned above, the records of the Regional Court in Mannheim normally include docu-
ments providing information about the patent, such as the name of the applicant, IPC classification,
dates of application, granting, publishing, and so on. For the Du¨sseldorf records, the statement
of claims contains most of this information, but the records are often incomplete in this regard.
A patent number, either issued by the EPO or the DPA, was accessible in 95% of the suits. In
cases where patent numbers could be matched, the information was updated using the PATDPA
or EPOLINE databases.
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3.2 Publicly Available Data
In order to complete the information about the patents involved in the disputes, data
from the German Patent Office (DPA) and the European Patent Office (EPO) were
added. Information on application dates, granting dates, IPC classifications, and
the applicants and inventors are available from the databases PATDPA and EPO-
LINE. PATDPA is the database of the German Patent Office and lists all patent
applications with all of the information included in the patent document. Addi-
tionally, all bibliographic data, such as fee payments, oppositions and their results,
changes of patentee, and lapsing of the patent in the public domain are viewable in
this file. PATDPA contains around 2.5 million patents and utility patents. It covers
patent data from 1976 to 1998. Beginning in 1978, the electronic form contains reli-
able information on patents and utilities. However, the information on the renewal
data is not complete. A similar database, ELPAC, is available from the European
Patent office. It includes all patent applications submitted to the EPO with roughly
the same variables, encompassing 1.2 million patent applications since 1978. The
important information about backward and forward citations was extracted via a
comprehensive search of the databases.5
As mentioned above, the records of the Regional Court in Mannheim normally
include documents which provide information about the patent, such as the name
of the applicant, IPC classification, dates of application, granting, publication, and
so on. The statement of claims in the Du¨sseldorf records contains most of this
information, although the records are often incomplete in this regard. A patent
number, either issued by the EPO or the DPA, was accessible in 95% of the suits.
In cases where patent numbers could be matched, the information was updated
using the PATDPA or ELPAC databases.
Since an official business register does not exist for Germany, I added the com-
plementary information on corporations using the database of the leading German
credit rating agency, the Verband der Vereine fu¨r Creditreform (Creditreform data)
in Neuss. Merging these data with the litigation data affords a more detailed pic-
ture of the corporations involved. Industry codes according to the European NACE
classification were added as well as firm size, measured by number of employees.
5A detailed description of the creation of the citation data file and the correction for truncation
following Hall et al. (2000) is given in Section 4.3.1.
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3.3 Creation of the Control Group
For an investigation of the differences between litigated and non-litigated patents,
it is necessary to create a control group of patents. I therefore have selected an ap-
propriate data set from the population of all German patents and European patents
granted between 1978 and 1995.6 I have stratified the control group by year of ap-
plication and the main IPC classification at the four–digit level. For each patent
in the group of litigated patents, one matched patent was drawn randomly from
the universe of German and European patents. When randomly chosen patents are
used as the control group, matched patents consist of those that were not subject
to a legal litigation suit. There is still a possibility that a patent chosen for the
control group was subject to an earlier or later dispute or to a dispute at one of
the other nine District Courts, but it is fairly small (about one percent) and can be
disregarded. I could not find comprehensive data in the database for patents in the
litigated group which had application dates prior to 1978. To ensure a one–to–one
match, I excluded those patents from the investigation group. The final sample of
litigated patents contains 824 patents with application dates from 1978 to 1993, and
the final reference group of non-litigated patents consists of 824 patents. All relevant
variables including citation data and information on patentees and technology fields
are included for these patents.
6Since all European patents granted in Germany are encompassed in PATDPA, I have drawn
the matched patents solely from the PATDPA; some additional information, however, came from
other data bases such as ELPAC and EPOLINE.
Chapter 4
Determinants of Patent Suit
Filings in Germany
4.1 Introduction
The original function of intellectual property rights (IPR) was to provide an instru-
ment which would ensure that inventors were able to recoup their investment in
research. However, awareness of the importance of this original function has de-
clined over the last 20 years. Other forms of appropriation, such as secrecy and first
mover- advantage, often prove to be much more effective methods of exploiting inno-
vation.1 Furthermore, inventions are increasingly produced on a mass scale to build
up a knowledge stock which is necessary in some technical areas to keep up with the
technological progress in cumulative technologies.2 As a result, the number of patent
applications and grants has risen during these years. In rapidly changing areas of
technology, patenting behavior has a signaling character showing the direction of
new developments. More strategic functions of patents are widely recognized, such
as signaling market potential in assigned fields of technology, safeguarding former
patents by enhancing the invention, or building a patent stock which can be used
as a bargaining chip in negotiations about new technologies and mergers. Addition-
ally, licensing and cross licensing have evolved into a large–scale profit source for
innovative firms with capacity constraints or a need for complementary technology.
1See Cohen et al. (2000) for survey evidence.
2See e.g. Hall and Ziedonis (2001).
17
4.1 Introduction 18
Patents have become strategic weapons, and the enforcement of IPR has become a
strategic means in technological competition.
Patent infringement suits are a costly way of enforcing intellectual property rights.
This Chapter analyzes the characteristics of patent infringement suits in Germany.
The most crucial argument in favor of the decision to file a suit is the expected
value of filing a dispute versus the expected value of not filing. The expected value
of filing a suit includes the innovation rents secured by the patent right net of all costs
involved in this dispute. This value depends mainly on the value of the patented
innovation but also on the characteristics of the parties as well as on technical
and economic conditions. The econometric analysis combines all these different
characteristics. The results show that small firms tend to sue more often than
larger ones and that this tendency is independent of the company’s technological
background. This result has a substantial impact on the conditions of insurance
contracts providing cover against the risk of patent litigation.
If patenting has a strategic character, then enforcement of patent rights includes
strategic elements as well. Enforcement of IPR includes a successful application
and granting procedure at the patent office. In some cases opposition procedures,
challenge or nullity suits are filed against granted patents. These procedures and
suits are part of the enforcement. A potential litigation suit brought before a district
court is the ultimate and most costly method of enforcing patent rights. Settlement
is always an option in all of these disputes. This might entail agreeing a license
or cross-license agreement which would satisfy both parties. Patenting is a costly
process, and enforcing the granted property right against infringement is likewise
associated with costs - i.e. the time and cost involved in the legal process. In
addition, the uncertainty during the dispute is linked with opportunity cost.
The estimated litigation rate in Germany is about 1 percent of all patents in force
at any given time. This figure seems quite low. However, large differences between
various fields of technology can be observed. It is expected that the probability
of litigation will be higher for more valuable patents (Lanjouw and Schankerman
(2003), Harhoff and Reitzig (2004)). The distribution of the value of patents is highly
skewed, meaning that most patents have little value.3 Accordingly, the number of
litigation cases is low, compared to the total number of patents in force. However,
3See Harhoff et al. (2003a) who analyzed the tail of patented invention value distribution.
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the rate of litigation remained constant even with growing numbers of applications
and grants.4
After an infringement is detected, the patentee may decide to negotiate with the
infringer about the IPR. From a game theory perspective it is clear that assuming
symmetric and complete information the parties should always reach a settlement
solution (Bebchuk (1984), Meurer (1989)). This result would minimize the cost of
the dispute, maximize the profits from the invention and optimize the compensation
for both parties from a welfare point of view. If agreement were the optimal outcome,
it is reasonable to ask why at least one patent suit is nevertheless filed every day
in Germany. One explanation for this failure to reach settlement in infringement
disputes could be that the parties form different expectations about the respective
payoffs and about their chances of prevailing at court, even though they have access
to the same information.
This study is the first empirical analysis of the determinants of patent and utility
litigation in Germany. A new and unique data set of 715 IPR cases will provide
new insight into the course and outcomes of litigation disputes. The data include
all cases filed at two of the three main District Courts in Germany during the
period from 1993 to 1995.5 These patent and utility suits covered 910 IPRs in
litigation. The data were combined with patent information from the German Patent
Office (DPMA) and the European Patent Office (EPO), both located in Munich.
Furthermore, a control group of 850 German patents randomly drawn from the
population of all patents ensured a comparable investigation and provided a means
of developing a system of determinants of IPR litigation in Germany.
Within a probit estimation I analyze the probability of litigation as a function
of a set of exogenous variables which reflect characteristics of the patent, market
conditions, and characteristics of the patent owner. As expected, I observe a higher
probability of litigation for patents which are more valuable than the average. This
is significant for all patent characteristics that were shown to be correlated with
the value of the patent Harhoff et al. (2003a). An additional strong result is the
4I calculated this rate by comparing the numbers in Stauder (1989) with the data I collected
for the District Courts in Mannheim and Duesseldorf.
5District Courts have special chambers which are exclusively responsible for dealing with IPR
suits. These are distributed throughout a region in order to give all possible plaintiffs the chance
to file a suit in the vicinity of the infringer.
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significant higher probability of small firms being involved in patent litigation and
this suggests that patents have a higher relative value for small companies compare
to larger ones.
The Chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.2 I outline a model of the
decision to litigate and derive hypotheses about the determinants of patent litigation.
Section 4.3 contains a description of the sample. I present empirical results for
Germany in Section 4.4. Finally, I discuss the results in section 4.5.
4.2 Theoretical Considerations on Parties’ Deci-
sion to Litigate or to Settle
4.2.1 Prior Research and Theoretical Framework
Theoretical work on the determinants of patent litigation indicates that the sample
of litigation cases is not a random selection of all possible suits (Priest and Klein
1984, Bebchuk 1984, Katz 1987). Following the argumentation in the selection model
of Priest and Klein (1984), all determinants of settlement and litigation are purely
economic. Their model indicates that parties will settle when their expectations
regarding the quality of the dispute and their involved stakes are similar.6 Further-
more, the litigation rate will increase (and the settlement rate will decrease) when
the cost of settlement is high relative to the cost of litigation. The authors assume
that the expectations the parties have of the outcome and their actual gains from
the litigation suit diverge, while the information on the stakes and the probability of
winning is distributed symmetrically. These data include the expected costs of the
court decisions, the information that parties possess on the likelihood of success, the
reputation gains or losses and the direct costs of a trial. Katz (1987) also observed
that demand for litigation is determined by the relation of the gains of a dispute
relative to its cost.
Subsequent models allow information to be allocated and knowledge distributed
in other ways among the parties and assume asymmetric and/or incomplete informa-
tion. For example, Meurer (1989) draws conclusions about litigation and settlement
6This is the case when the true value of the dispute lies far from the decision standard of the
court, whether in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant.
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decisions in different information situations and different allocation rules. Bebchuk
(1984) developed a model based on the assumption that parties make decisions based
on incomplete and asymmetric information. Spier (1992) extends the analysis to-
ward a sequential game with asymmetric and incomplete information.7 Waldfogel
(1998) clearly differentiates between the predictions the two main underlying types
of litigation models, asymmetric information and diverging expectations, generate
about trial rates and winning rates.8 However, the approach of Priest and Klein
(1984) has become the standard model in economic literature on patent infringe-
ment and challenge cases, since information in IP suits flows through documents
and electronic files relatively easily and is associated with low costs. Therefore,
symmetric information is a reasonable assumption in this case. Moreover, knowl-
edge of law practice is highly internationalized and domestically owned firms do
not therefore enjoy significant advantages in this respect over parties from abroad.
The results of most empirical research on the enforcement of property rights and
the determinants of patent litigation are based on these assumptions in order to
model the conditions under which litigation cases will be brought to trial (Lanjouw
and Schankerman 2001, 2003, Lanjouw and Lerner 2001, Lanjouw and Lerner 1998,
Ziedonis 2003, Somaya 2003). The same basic idea was also applied to a model of
opposition to pharmaceutical and biotechnology patents at the EPO by Harhoff and
Reitzig (2004).
One drawback of these models is that they start their analysis after the suit has
already been filed. This approach disregards the decision of the potential infringer
to enter the market with a potential imitation as well as the decision of the patentee
to file suit against a detected infringer. The problem with analyzing a selection of
7Spierpresents a model of sequential bargaining where one-sided incomplete information is
assumed. Pretrial negotiations are shown as finite-horizon bargaining game in which the uniformed
plaintiff makes the settlement offers. There exist equilibria where no agreement is reached and the
agents go to trial even though the court costs are involved in order to accept the final offer.
8The diverging expectation model (DE) assumes that the parties estimations of the winning
probability and the case quality are random but unbiased. When the underlying model assumes
asymmetric information (AI) then one party has private information about the probability of
winning. Within the DE model smaller judgement amounts or higher costs (or lower standard
deviations of the estimation errors) induce decreased trial rates which cause the win rate to converge
to 50 percent. In the AI model a decreased trial rate causes the win rate to approach zero. Only
strong defendants will litigate while the weak ones (and those facing strong plaintiffs) will settle.
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patent suits is that it is not possible to observe the population of all infringed patents
in reference to the potential base of all possible suits. Investigations of litigation
always lack observation of the infringement rate. To the best of my knowledge,
this problem has not been solved in either the theoretical literature or in empirical
investigations.9 All results regarding the probability of patent litigation are actually
statements about the (conditional) probability of a litigation suit given that the
patent has been infringed and the infringement has been detected by the patent
holder.10
Figure 4.1: General Structure of a Patent Infringement Dispute
Potential Infringement
Settlement
Trial Preliminary Injunction
Legal Dispute = Litigation
The general paths of enforcing a property right are shown in Figure 1 according to
the legal rules outlined in Chapter 2. First, a potential property right infringement
occurs. The patentee then considers one of two possible responses. The first is to
make an offer to settle out of court. This usually entails offering a license agreement.
9Lanjouw and Schankerman (2003) refer to this problem in their study and argue: “If a patent
dispute is settled before a suit is filed, we do not observe the dispute in the data. Thus low filing
rates can either reflect low rates of infringement or high probability of pre-suit settlement.”(p.149).
10Crampes and Langinier (2002) consider a two-stage game involving the decisions of the po-
tential entrant to infringe and of the patentee to sue explicitly. From their model they derive
predictions about rate of infringement (in the sense of market entry). Frequency of infringing
entry is negatively correlated with the amount of the penalty for infringement and usually also
with settlement cost, efficiency of legal procedures, and probability of infringement identification.
Within their framework, the bargaining power of the patent holder has no unambiguous impact
on the frequency of entry. The predictions of Crampes and Langinier are in the line with earlier
results of theoretical literature on litigation and settlement (Perloff and Rubinfeld 1987, Ordover
and Rubinstein 1986, P’ng 1983, Cooter and Rubinfeld 1989.)
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If this offer is accepted, the matter is then settled. Second and alternatively, the
patentee can file a statement of claims in order to start a legal action. A legal
action may be a regular suit or a request for a preliminary injunction.11 Modelling
the decision to file a suit I do not distinguish between filing an ordinary suit and a
preliminary injunction because, in the German system, the parties expect that an
ordinary suit will be filed after the injunction has been granted in order to reach a
final judgement.
In the following I introduce the decision problem of the parties in a framework
presented by Priest and Klein (1984). The patentee and the infringer decide on
whether to litigate or to settle. I assume complete and symmetric information on all
facts necessary to form expectations of the probabilities of granting and winning as
well as the payoffs and costs of the dispute.12 However, due to idiosyncracies parties
do not necessarily expect the same winning probability or similar values. Parties
will go to trial if their expected return net of legal costs is equal or larger than the
expected outcome of a settlement. Thresholds of the patentee and the litigant have
the following form:
ppl [V +D(V )] + (1− ppl)
[
δ
2
V − C(V )
]
≥ (1 + α)δ
2
V Patentee(4.1)
−pi[D(V ) + C(V )] + (1− pi)
[
δ
2
V + C(V )
]
≥ (1− α)δ
2
V Litigant (4.2)
Parties form expectations regarding the probability that the plaintiff (patentee)
will prevail. Therefore, ppl and pi are expected probabilities of the plaintiff and the
11Lanjouw and Lerner (2001) apply the request of a preliminary injunction as a second, separate
way to start an action before court. The injunction process can have a substantial impact on the
payoffs. The patentee has to make clear that in order for him or her to avoid considerable harm
a fast decision is necessary. Additionally, he or she has to make the claims clear. Both are very
costly in terms of attorney expenses. For a defendant (or the potential infringer) the preliminary
injunction imposes a significant danger because it can nullify all or a large part of his or her business
(Lanjouw and Lerner 2001)
12I cannot completely exclude the possibility of asymmetric information on all matters pertain-
ing to the litigation process and its outcome, such as strength of the patent right and extent of
the patent protection which will be elucidated by the judges during the trial. Different knowledge
about the applicability of the patented innovation and market conditions can also affect the deci-
sion to litigate. But the information about the technical details of the patent, the main economic
facts about the litigants and the understanding of the jurisdictional system are available to all
parties.
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infringer, respectively that the plaintiff will win the dispute. In the case where the
patentee prevails, he or she earns V and is paid damages D(V ).13 V is the profit the
patentee expects to gain by exploiting the patent alone (i.e., without infringement or
license agreement). With probability 1− p the court votes against the patentee and
he or she has to pay both his or her own legal expenses and those of the prevailing
defendant.14 In this case, more than one company uses the patented innovation and
δ reflects the extent to which the respected industry profit is lowered.
The right hand sides of (1) and (2) show the settlement value for the patentee
and the infringer, respectively. In order to avoid an infringement suit the plaintiff
allowed the competitor to use the patented innovation and received royalty payments
for the production of the patented innovation. A license agreement will enhance
the profit for the patentee by the license fee α on which the parties agreed. Such
a license agreement may include price and output restrictions for the competitor,
and it may also define the explicit license fees to be paid to the patentee.15 The
parameter α is the share of profit the competitor has to surrender to the patentee
and (1 − α) δ
2
V the settlement payoff of the potential infringer.16 While only C(V)
is observable it actually consists of the two two types of legal costs c and a in
a way like C(V ) = c(V ) + a(V ). The first type are court costs c which do not
depend on the patentee’s opportunities on the financial market or on his efforts in
the case. The second type is the attorney cost a and depends heavily on the efforts
one party undertakes in the suit and on the financial conditions it faces on the
market in funding these activities. By law, all legal costs must be proportional to
the size of the case by a factor τ smaller than one. The size of the case is the loss the
patentee is expected to suffer when the potential infringer uses the invention without
permission during the time of dispute and is calculated as difference between the
possible monopoly profit and the patentee’s fraction of the non-settlement profit,
(V − 1
2
δV ).
13There are three main methods of calculating damages, all of which depend on the value the
patent creates on the market (Reitzig et al. 2003). Additionally, the time length of infringement
and the time left on the patent is enclosed within the expectations the parties make.
14According to the British rule of cost allocation the losing party has to bear all legal costs.
However, in jurisdictional practice not all attorney expenses are taxable.
15I assume that there is no strong antitrust regime.
16It is also possible that the patentee will not proceed to trial even if the potential infringer
rejects a settlement offer. The license fee in this case is zero.
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4.2.2 Hypotheses on the Determinants of Patent Litigation
Filing
Equations (1) and (2) show that the probability of patent litigation depends on
the profit V the parties expect to earn by using the patented innovation. V is a
function of the characteristics of the patent xp, the characteristics of the firm, xpl
and xi, V = V (xp, xpl, xi). I consider the profit V in the model as a close correlate
to the value of the patent which is a wider concept including the strategic capacity
as well as the signaling and blocking power of the patent. Thresholds (1) and (2)
clearly reveal a positive impact of the value of a patent on the incentives to enforce
it (Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001, 2003). With increasing value of the patent for
both the patentee and the infringer the direct incentive to proceed to trial rather
than settle increases.
Higher values also raise the probability of infringements, which leads implicitly to
a higher probability of litigation. As referred to above, the probability of infringe-
ment is not observable; the only evidence, offered by Harhoff and Reitzig (2004)
shows that the probability of opposition as an early type of attack against a granted
patent increases with the value of the patent. In the following I derive hypothe-
ses on how these characteristics influence the probability of a patent litigation suit.
The expected winning probabilities ppl and pi also depend on the characteristics of
patentees and the information available to them.
Characteristics of the Patent
The impact the characteristics of patent have on the probability of litigation is
mainly due to their correlation with the value of the patent. From the argumentation
above I derive the following hypothesis:
H1: The probability of patent litigation at a German Court is ceteris paribus (c.p.)
high for patents with a high value.
This Hypotheses is per se not testable. Patents are heterogenous and supply differ-
ent levels of additional profit to companies through the original protection function
and strategic functions (Somaya 2003). The value a single patent has for its paten-
tee is not directly observable. The impact that patent portfolios or patent stocks
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have on firm value, profits, and sales is hard to identify from survey data (Harhoff
et al. 2003). Using a set of value correlates to derive a set of hypotheses which
formulates the expected relationship between those correlates and the likelihood of
court litigation in Germany.
In the European patent system the patent applicant suggests patents which should
be included as references to the prior art. However, the examiner (either of the
EPO or the DPMA) makes the ultimate decision on what patents will be included
as backward citations. In contrast, for a U.S. application the applicant is requested
to name all references to the state of the art using patent or non-patent literature,
which leads to more citations and to the quotation publications which are only
tenuously linked to the applied invention. Michel and Bettels (2001) emphasize
that US citations appear to represent more of a documentary than patentability
search. References to earlier patents in the German and European system mark
the boundaries of patentability and the bases the invention builds on. They are
used to substantiate the patentability for which novelty and inventive activity is
necessary. This function of citations implies that the number of citations received
(forward citations) play a similar role to that of references in scientific publications
as an indicator for the importance of the patent. Trajtenberg (1990) provided major
support for this argument and Harhoff et al. (2003a) provided more broad evidence
of the correlation between patent value and citations received in subsequent patent
applications. Using the information the citing patents provide, citations can be used
as ingredients in the construction of measures for “originality” and “generality” (Hall
et al. 2001). Even though the forward citation can point to further development and
depreciation of the former invention, the value enhancing effect should be dominant
as supportive survey evidence (Harhoff et al. 2003).
H1.1: Patents which received a large number of forward citations in subsequent
patent applications have c.p. a higher probability of litigation than less cited
patents.
References made to prior patents (backward citations) in both the EPO and
DPMA patent applications reflect the related state of the art. Lanjouw and
Schankerman (2003) argue that a large number of references in the patent appli-
cation indicates a well-developed technology with less uncertainty than newly devel-
oped technologies, making litigation less likely. Another argument is presented by
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Harhoff et al. (2003a). They point out that patent applications with broad patent
claims induce a large number of references to prior patents which describe the cur-
rent patent application more precisely and therefore increase its precision. In line
with these arguments a patent with a higher number of references to prior patent
applications is more secure against infringement than those with a lower number of
references. But, as Harhoff et al. (2003a) also argue, the logic of these references
is to indicate subject matter that may restrict the scope of the patent claims when
they are presented against the claims of application. Following this argumentation a
larger number of backward citations is linked with a higher uncertainty about claims.
Competitors are more likely to infringe insecure claims and c.p. the probability of
suits will be higher.
H1.2: The correlation of backward citation with the probability of litigation is
positive.
Empirical studies found mixed evidence of the relationship between the number of
references and the probability of a patent dispute. While the number of references to
prior patents is confirmed to be significantly positive correlated with the monetary
value of German patents (Harhoff et al. 2003) no significant correlation of the total
number of backward citations in EPO applications on the probability of opposition
could be found by Harhoff and Reitzig (2004). The U.S.– based study of Lanjouw
and Schankerman (2001) does not report any significant effects of backward citations
per claim on the probability of litigation either, although - using an updated data
set - they do show a negative effect(Lanjouw and Schankerman 2003).
A patentee can file patent applications for the same subject matter in more than
one jurisdiction, building a patent family. Within the one year of priority he or
she can file exactly the same patent application at certain patent offices while still
fulfilling the requirement of novelty. The number of jurisdictions representing family
size as a value correlate of patents was introduced by Putnam (1996). He argued that
multiple applications are associated with expensive legal fees and translation costs.
It is a suitable variable because it reflects the patent holder’s private estimation of
the patent’s value.
H1.3: The number of jurisdictions patent protection was sought for is, c.p., posi-
tively correlated with the probability of litigation.
4.2 Theoretical Considerations on Parties’ Decision to Litigate or to Settle 28
All patent claims define the boundaries of an invention in words to provide the
public with notice of what the invention is and to enable it to avoid infringing the
patent. A patent usually comprises a bundle of independent claims which define
the basic elements of the invention. Additional subordinate claims describe the
invention in more detail. The independent claims have greater relevance to the
value of the patent than the subordinate claims. Broad patents, indicated by a
high number of total claims, are more likely to be infringed. Since the probability
of litigation is a condition of the probability of infringement, c.p., the probability
of litigation depends on the number of claims. Positive relationships between the
number of claims and the probability of a patent being subject to a dispute are
found in Lanjouw and Schankerman (2003), Graham et al. (2003) for the American
enforcement patent system. Harhoff and Reitzig (2004) reported a higher probability
of for patents with a large number of claims. For the probability of litigation before
court in the German system I formulate the following hypothesis:
H1.4: The number of claims is c.p. a positively correlated with the probability of
patent litigation.
As explained in Chapter 2 there are three different ways of seeking protection in
more than one country. First, a patentee can file an application with the domestic
patent office in each country. Second, the European Patent Office can provide pro-
tection within any or all of the member states of the European Patent Convention
via just one application. Applying per PCT application is the third way and offers
patent protection in all member states of the PCT. In a study by Thumm (2000)
the “road of application” is used to indicate the importance an invention has for
the inventor or applicant. PCT applications are similar to EPO patents; they seek
protection in more than one jurisdiction within the member states. I assume that
facing the higher cost of a PCT or EPO application compared to a DPMA appli-
cation the applicant expects compensation through higher profits and this values
the patent more highly. Even though PCT applications are expensive in total they
secure priorities and save translation costs during the first 30 months after applica-
tion has been made.This period of time is called the ”international phase” during
which the applicants can further develop the invention and are better informed af-
ter 30 months to decide whether they will proceed into the ”national phase” or not;
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depending on the expected value of the patent application. Only during the ”na-
tional phase” the designated states for validity have to be presented and do the fees
and translations for these applications become due. I anticipate that only the most
valuable of patents proceed to the national phase of the PCT application procedure.
H1.5: Patents which are applied for via the PCT path have, c.p., a higher probabil-
ity of being litigated than patents directly filed at the EPO or at the German
Patent Office. The application path via EPO leads to a higher probability of
litigation than that of the German Patent Office.
Patents issued by the EPO or the DPMA can be subject to opposition. Any
third party can file such a procedure, claiming that the invention is not new or
the inventive step is not significant enough. An opposition is an official act at the
patent office that seeks to declare a patent invalid or to amend it.17 If the potentially
infringing party opposes the patent before the suit begins it seems likely that this
party will have an interest in using the invention itself and not in leaving the right
to the patentee. One reason for such an interest could be that the opposing (and
potentially infringing) party has made a similar invention. Another reason might
be that the expected value of the protected invention is so high that it is worth
opposing and later infringing in order to appropriate at least some of the payoffs
of the protected innovation. Harhoff et al. (2003a) found that patents which have
defeated an opposition procedure are significantly more valuable than those patents
which have not been not attacked. This finding was strengthened by the analysis
of Harhoff and Reitzig (2004), who show in a theoretical model that opposed EPO
patents in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals are generally more valuable, than
those which were not opposed when measured by several value indicators. On the
one hand a higher expected value of a patent attracts more exploitative interests
and leads to a higher probability of legal dispute. On the other hand, a patent which
has faced opposition becomes more valuable because it indicates a stronger patent
right; this will increase the plaintiff’s expectations about the probability of winning
the case, ppl. I expect that both effects lead to a positive impact on the probability
of litigation (Graham et al. 2003).
17See Harhoff and Reitzig (2004) and for a detailed description of the opposition procedure.
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H1.6: Patents which faced an opposition procedure after granting are c.p. more
likely to be involved in a subsequent litigation procedure.
The hypotheses H1.1 to H1.6 generally state that the patent value correlates are
positively linked to the probability of litigation before German courts.
Characteristics of the Patentee
The characteristics of the patentee is related to the idiosyncratic realization of the
patent values and the opportunities of the parties to solve a legal dispute before
court. Main findings for the U.S. show that the size of the patentee (Lanjouw and
Schankerman 2003, Harhoff and Reitzig 2004) and the relative size of the parties
(Somaya, 2003) have a considerable impact on the probability of being involved in
a patent dispute. In general, large firms are less likely to be involved in litigation
suits than smaller ones. One reason for this may be that large firms estimate the
value of an invention differently in relation to their overall profits. In most empirical
studies, size is measured in technical terms (number of previous patents granted to
the patentee). As indicators for the absolute size served mainly dummies for listed
and unlisted companies and dummies for individuals. Accounting figures such as
turnover or number of employees are rarely available (Lanjouw and Schankerman
2003, Harhoff and Reitzig 2004, Graham and Somaya 2004). It is generally assumed
that economically large firms tend to have more patents than small firms. A finan-
cially strong firm has a higher potential to threaten a suit as it is better equipped
to bear all the costs involved over a longer period of time.
H2: Large firms face, c.p., a smaller probability of patent litigation than small ones.
Companies with a large portfolio of previous patents are more experienced in en-
forcing their rights. Additionally, firms with a large portfolio of similar patents have
more opportunities to keep α small and to offer cross licensing agreements for set-
tlement. This would result in less legal litigation suits even though companies with
a large portfolio of patents probably face more infringement issues than companies
with smaller patent portfolios. They are likely to be involved in more potential in-
fringement disputes as well as more license bargaining. The argument that repeated
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interaction of firms with large patent portfolios leads to a higher threat point in
settlement bargaining is made by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2003) and points to
a lower likelihood of legal disputes but a higher likelihood of infringement disputes
without involvement of courts. However, this is only of importance in cases when
the financial markets are incomplete. Firms also use frequent interactions to build
up a reputation in respect of their strength in enforcing their property rights. It
is not clear whether the experience in bargaining, the reputation gained through
prior disputes, or the high expected costs of repeated disputes lead to a smaller
probability of litigation before courts for these companies. But this will be of less
importance when a certain level of patent portfolio size is reached. Since the effect
of higher incidence of infringement when the number of patents in the portfolio is
high is still evident, I expect for very high portfolio sizes also a higher likelihood of
litigation.
H3: Firms with a large number of previously granted patents (a large patent port-
folio) are, c.p., less likely to be involved in patent litigation suits. The rela-
tionship will be U-shaped.
Because of an individual patentee’s tendency to be personally involved in the
enforcement of “their patent”, I expect a bias towards more litigation suits when
such patent owners are involved. Individuals tend to be more optimistic in evaluating
the profits of a patented innovation (Astebro 2003). According to the model outlined
above this would lead to a higher risk of litigation for individuals when compared to
companies. A significantly higher probability of domestic individuals suing potential
infringers is also a stable stylized fact and is shown in the studies on the U.S. above
cited. This is partly due to larger relative stakes individuals have in such suits.
Individuals patenting software innovations in the U.S. were found by Graham and
Somaya (2004) to be more litigious than companies. Lanjouw and Schankerman
(2003) offer mixed evidence - positive in the case of domestic individuals, negative
for foreign individual patent owners. I also expect individuals to be more likely to
be involved in patent litigation than companies.
H4: Individuals are, c.p., more likely to litigate than companies.
I expect the origin of the patentee to be significant owing to the different costs
of aquiring access to information. The probability of litigation should be higher for
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Germans than for foreign patent owners. I would also expect European patentees to
be involved in patent litigation suits more often than owners from non- European
countries because of the lower expected costs (Harhoff and Reitzig 2004). Foreign
patentees have per se the same access to information regarding the patented inven-
tion. However, translation and attorney costs for the German jurisdictional system
are considerable and lower their propensity to sue at a German district court.
4.3 Sample Description
4.3.1 Variables
In section 4.2.2 I introduced the theoretical determinants of the probability of liti-
gation. In the following I link them to a set of independent variables consisting of
those which are related to the characteristics of the patent as an invention, those
which describe the patentee, and those which are related to the market situation
and conditions for innovative activity. From the data I introduced in Chapter 3 I
use the data on all identified litigated patents and the control group of non–litigated
patents. Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for the variables used in my the anal-
ysis. The first block contains the patent characteristics. The characteristics of the
patent holder are displayed in the second block.
Patent Characteristics
For an analysis of forward citations I searched the patent databases PATDPA
(FORW CIT D) and ELPAC (FORW CIT E) and counted the number of subse-
quent patent applications which cite the investigated patent as “prior art”. I trun-
cated the number of forward citations at the first filing year 1993. Furthermore, it is
not certain that the full number of citations received is documented in the PATDPA
even for the oldest patents with application dates in the early 1970s. To correct for
this truncation bias I used the method of “fixed effects” as described in detail in
Hall et al. (2002). The underlying assumption of this approach is that all differences
in the citation intensities over time are due to artifacts. Citation behavior does not
change over time and the number of forward citations per patent and per cohort is
constant. Annual effects are eliminated by dividing the number of forward citations
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for all Exogenous Variables
All Litigated Matched
Exogenous Variable Mean Mean Mean
(SD) (SD) (SD)
Citations Received in DPMA and EPO 2.329 3.412∗ 1.246∗
(FORW CIT D+E) (4.302) (5.378) (2.403)
References made 2.981 3.430∗ 2.533∗
(BACKW CIT D+E) (2.733) (2.905) (2.470)
Number of Independent Patent Claims 9.558 10.500∗ 8.617∗
(CLAIMS) (8.394) (9.621) (6.831)
Number of Jurisdictions 5.137 5.576∗ 4.697∗
(FAMILY SIZE) (5.647) (6.234) (4.956)
Opposition Procedure Survived 0.160 0.271∗ 0.050∗
(OPPOSITION) (0.367) (0.445) (0.218)
Application at EPO 0.266 0.260 0.272
(EPO APPL) (0.442) (0.439) (0.445)
Application via PCT 0.047 0.032∗ 0.062∗
(PCT APPL) (0.211) (0.175) (0.241)
Number of Patents in Portfolio 0.159 0.074∗ 0.244∗
(PATENT PORTFOLIO) (0.713) (0.428) (0.905)
Plaintiff is an Individual 0.166 0.091∗ 0.241∗
(INDIVIDUALS) (0.372) (0.288) (0.428)
Plaintiff is a Small Company 0.178 0.261∗ 0.096∗
(SMALL FIRM) (0.383) (0.439) (0.295)
Plaintiff is Medium Sized Company 0.302 0.335∗ 0.268∗
(MEDIUM SIZE FIRM) (0.459) (0.472) (0.443)
Plaintiff is a Large Company 0.354 0.313∗ 0.394∗
(LARGE FIRM) (0.478) (0.464) (0.489)
Patent Owner is from Germany 0.667 0.771∗ 0.564∗
(OWNER DE) (0.471) (0.421) (0.496)
Patent Owner is EU, but non-German 0.174 0.146∗ 0.203∗
(OWNER FOR EU) (0.379) (0.353) (0.402)
Patent Owner is from the US 0.096 0.065∗ 0.127∗
(OWNER FOR US) (0.295) (0.248) (0.334)
Patent Owner is from Japan 0.047 0.015∗ 0.079∗
(OWNER FOR JP) (0.211) (0.120) (0.270)
Patent Owner is from Other Countries 0.015 0.004∗ 0.027∗
(OWNER FOR Other) (0.122) (0.060) (0.161)
Number of observation 1648 824 824
Numbers with
∗
differ statistically significant at 1% level.
of a patent by the mean of forward citations of its cohort. I used this weighted
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forward citation in the analysis.
The samples of both litigated and non-litigated patents include 438 patents that
were originally filed at the EPO. The other 1,210 were originally applied for at the
DPMA. Reliable information on forward citation was available only at the original
patent office. Owing to this lack of data I combined both sources of information
and eliminated double counts. The resulting number of citations includes all unique
citaions at the EPO and DPMA (FORW CIT D+E). Tables 4.2 and 4.3 indicate
the main properties of these citation variables and contains the disentangled means
for references made and citations received at the DPMA (FORW CIT D) and at the
EPO (FORW CIT E) as well as the combined figures (FORW CIT D+E).
Table 4.2: Forward Citation in EPO and DPMA by Litigated and Non-Litigated Patents
Litigated Non-Litigated All
Mean Obs Mean Obs Sample Mean Obs
(SD) (SD) (SD)
FORW CIT D 3.271 610 1.055 600 2.172 1210
(2.252) (0.087) (0.126)
FORW CIT E 2.766 214 1.027 224 1.877 438
(0.246) (0.110) (0.139)
FORW CIT D+E 3.412 824 1.246 824 2.329 1648
(0.187) (0.084) (4.302)
Forward Citations are available for both offices. Forw Cit D+E is the sum of both after
removing double counts.
First, I draw on table 4.2, column 5 to compare the sample means of the forward
citations. On average, an original European patent in the sample is cited in 1.877
subsequent European patent applications. Surprisingly, this number is significantly
smaller than for German subsequent applications. Original German applications
in the sample have an average of 2.172 forward citations. One reason might be
that patents valid in Germany are more frequently cited at the DPMA because
it is the relevant market. For European patent citations patents from other EPC
member states are more important as far as the first to file rule is concerned. In all
cases litigated patents are more frequently cited than unlitigated patents, which is
expected in H1.1. On average, the number of combined forward citations is 2.33,
while litigated patents received 2.8 times more forward citations than unlitigated
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patents (table 5.2).18
I now turn to the number of backward citations, which I summarize in detail
in table 4.3. This variable was subject to a similar problem to the one affecting
forward citations. For the 1,210 patents originally filed at the DPMA I used citations
from the DPMA publication (BACKW CIT D). For the 438 applications which were
made solely at the EPO with designation to Germany I implemented the backward
citations from EPO (BACKW CIT E). While Michel and Bettels (2001) stress the
diversity in citation attitudes among the triad patent jurisdictions (US, EPO, JP),
there are also differences between the EPO and the DPMA. Again, I use both
variables in parallel (BACKW CIT D+E) because, for original EPO patents, only
the references in the EPO publications documents are available (BACKW CIT E).
While the average of BACKW CIT D is 2.401, the mean of BACKW CIT E is
4.559. The difference is statistically significant. In general, litigated patents tend
to cite more references to prior patents than unlitigated patents by a factor of 1.5.
However this is driven by backward citations of the original German applications.
For patents that were applied for at the European Patent Office, BACKW CIT EPO
is not significantly different between litigated or unlitigated patents.19
Table 4.3: Backward Citation in EPO and DPMA by Litigated and Non-Litigated Patents
Litigated Non-Litigated All
Mean Obs Mean Obs Sample Mean Obs
(SD) (SD) (SD)
BACKW CIT D 2.964 610 1.828 600 2.401 1210
(2.744) (1.974) (2.459)
BACKW CIT E 4.757 214 4.420 224 4.584 438
(2.950) (2.672) (2.813)
BACKW CIT D+E 3.430 824 2.533 824 2.981 1648
(0.101) (0.086) (2.733)
Backward Citation were available only for the original filing patent office. Backw Cit D+E
is the combination of either Backw Cit DPMA or Backw Cit EPO.
18For all variables in table 5.2 a test of equal means was conducted. Numbers with ∗ indicate
significant differences at the 1% level.
19I am grateful to Stefan Wagner from Inno-tec Munich who provided excellent citation infor-
mation from the EPOLINE data bases, collected in cooperation with the EPO.
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For the following variables, information is available both for original German
patents and original European patents in the same quality. The description is con-
solidated in table 5.2. The number of claims was received directly from the patent
documents which can be downloaded from the databases (CLAIMS). I calculated
the number of independent claims. In this study I used the number of claims as
a measure of patent breadth.20. The number of claims differs between the groups.
While 9.6 claims were filed on average across the entire sample, the patents not
involved in litigation had an average of 8.6 claims and the litigated patents 10.5.
Patent data bases usually contain a set of variables which reveal family infor-
mation. FAMILY SIZE is defined as the number of jurisdictions in which patent
protection was sought. It conforms to the definition of family size used by Put-
nam (1996). After removing double counts this variable was directly obtained from
PATDPA to be used in this analysis. At the EPO the variable for family size is
not readily available; the number of designated states includes only states which
are members of the European Patent Organization and does not include jurisdic-
tions such as the U.S. or Japan. The average family size of litigated patents differs
significantly from that of unlitigated patents (5.6 and 4.7).
Patents which were filed via the PCT application path (PCT APPL) are rare
within the sample of litigated patents. The number of PCT application actually
remained very small until the end of the 1980s and started growing at the beginning
of the 90s. Generally, only 1.7 per cent of patents were sought via PCT in 1980,
but this rose to around 25% by the late 1990s. Because the bulk of the patents
in the sample were applied for between 1982 and 1987 the PCT applications play
only a minor role as a way of seeking patent protection. Across the entire sample,
protection was sought via PCT application in 4.7% of the cases and via EPO ap-
plication in 26.6%. Within the litigated group of patents, the share of PCT APPL
is significantly lower (3.2%). The numbers for original EPO patents (EPO APPL)
differ insignificantly between the two groups.
A dummy variable indicates whether an opposition procedure had been filed
(Opposition) either at the EPO or at the DPMA. In this analysis I discuss the issue
of prior opposition as such. I have not differentiated between the procedures at the
20There exist several concepts of how to operationalize the scope of a patent. Lerner (1994)
used the number of four digit IPC-subclasses a patent was assigned to
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German Patent Office and the EPO, even though national opposition affects the
validity of a patent only for the German market, a European one has effects for
all designated states.21 An opposition against a European patent may exercise an
impact on the country in which it is decided to file a litigation suit. As I am not able
to conduct a European comparison of patent litigation suits I only use information
on whether a patent was opposed after granting or not. Litigated patents were
opposed five times more often than patents in the control group.
Characteristics of the Patentee
The dummy variable INDIVIDUAL defines whether the patentee is an individual or
a company. In cases where the patentee as potential plaintiff was indicated as a cor-
poration, the size and industry variables were added. For the foreign corporations
the data were completed by searches using internet and information from several
firm databases.22 Finally, four size classes were constructed using sales figures. The
first includes all individuals, the second small firms with sales totaling less than 10
million DM (SMALL FIRM); the third is for medium sized firms with sales of more
than 10 million DM up to 100 million DM (MEDIUM SIZE FIRM); the fourth class
includes all large firms with sales of more than 100 million DM (LARGE FIRM).23
While the share of SMALL FIRM for litigated patents is 26.1% , 2.7 times higher
than the 9.6% in the group of unlitigated patents, this difference decreases for
MEDIUM SIZE FIRM from 33.4% to 26.8%, by factor 1.2). LARGE FIRM are
less frequently represented as patentees in the group of litigated patents than in the
unlitigated group (31.3% versus 39.5%). The relation is 0.8. Individuals are less
likely to be owners of a litigated patent. 24.2% of the unlitigated patents are held
by individuals compared to only 9.1% of the litigated patents. Table 5.2 shows that
all of differences are statistically significant.
I constructed the variable patent portfolio size (PATENT PORTFOLIO) as the
number of all patents of the patentee which were in force at the time the law suit was
21Between European and German patents no significant differences in opposition frequency is
observable. The shares of opposed patents are 16.4 and 15.7, respectively.
22Commercially provided firm databases are Creditreform, MARKUS, AMADEUS, Hoppenst-
edt, and for the U.S., the COMPUSTAT file.
23The size classes defined in Euro are approximately: less than 5 million Euro, up to 50 million
Euro, more than 50 million Euro.
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filed. It is the sum of all applications granted at the DPMA starting from 1978 to the
year of filing. I also used the EPO applications which were designated for Germany
because I intended to interpret the portfolio partly as a means of bargaining in the
German market. The average portfolio size is 1,590. It ranges from 1 to 66,369. As
expected, for foreign firms the portfolio size is smaller with 1,262 on average. Even
though there is a large difference between domestic and foreign applicants, it is not
statistically significant. Non-German litigating parties have a larger portfolio than
German litigating parties.
Additionally, in table 5.2 I used the respective owner’s base nation to iden-
tify domestic and foreign patentees. The owners are from the EU, the U.S.,
Japan, and others (OWNER FOR EU, OWNER FOR US, OWNER FOR JP, and
OWNER FOR OTHER). The probability of litigation should be higher for Ger-
mans, of course, and also among foreigners with respect to European patentees
because of the lower expected costs. The share of patent owners who have their
headquarters in Germany is almost two-thirds in the sample. Within the group of
litigating parties it increases up to 76.6%. The share of European patentees among
foreign patent holders is higher than 50 percent. As expected, patentees from the
EU are more likely to be involved in litigation suits than patentees from other for-
eign countries. U.S. patentees are represented less often in the group of litigating
parties and the shares of Japanese and other owners are even lower.
4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
My analysis of the determinants of patent litigation suits in Germany is based on a
sample of 824 patents for which applications were made to and patents granted by
the German Patent Office or the European Patent Office and which were involved in
patent litigation at the district court in Du¨sseldorf or Mannheim during the period
1993 to 1995.24 Applications for preliminary injunctions are included within the
24Stauder (1996) determined that these two district courts treat about 55 to 60litigation cases
in Germany. I assume that the tendency to file suits at certain district courts has not changed
decisively over time. Likewise, the reasons for forum shopping did not change from the analysis
period of Stauder (1989) 1971 to 1973 to the recent period from 1993 to 1995.
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group of litigated patents. They are also regarded as filed suits given that a prelimi-
nary injunction is usually followed by a regular suit. The number of applications for
a preliminary injunction almost doubled from 69 in the period 1972-1974 to 109 in
the period from 1993-1995.25 I begin with describing the structure of the litigation
sample as it compares with the control group and the general characteristics of the
population of all German patents.
As Lanjouw and Schankerman found for the U.S. the litigation rate varies dra-
matically among technologies. IPC-codes are used at the DPMA and EPO in the
same way to assign inventions to a field of technology. Each patent will be assigned
to one (principle) or more IPC classes, each of which consists of a 4 digit main class
and a 4-5 digit subclass. The principle IPC class is used to categorize the patent
into a technical area (drugs, chemicals, mechanicals, electronics, others). In order
to compare the results with the U.S. studies the data were aggregated in a way
similar to the area-definition used by Lanjouw and Schankerman (1997). Table 4.4
shows how the distribution within the main technical area differs among the total
population of patents within the same cohorts as the sample. It is apparent that
the share of pharmaceutical patents is roughly the same in the sample as in the uni-
verse. However, patents applied for in chemicals represent half of the share within
the sample distribution compared to the overall patent grants. Imitation of chemical
raw material is relatively easy to detect. This should be true for pharmaceutical
patents as well. However, as biotechnology, which was a relatively new technology
in the period of investigation, is also included, the share of pharmaceutical patents
involved in disputes is higher than the overall share would suggest. Patented me-
chanical inventions are the subject of litigation disputes more often than their share
among the universe indicates.
Table 4.4 shows the differences in the technology structures. The most striking
fact is that the share of litigated patents granted in Mechanics amounts to 52.18%
while it is only 37.79% on average in the German population in comparable appli-
cation years. Defining claims for a mechanical invention is more complicated than
in the case of a chemical formula, for example. Thus, infringement is more likely
and, more importantly, the proof of infringement is more difficult to obtain. Parties
will have different expectations of their probability of winning, and this will make
25Refer to the data in Stauder (1989) for comparative purposes.
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Table 4.4: Distribution of Patents Across Technical Areas, by Litigated and Non-
Litigated Patents
Frequency and Shares of Patents in Main Technical Areas
Technology German population Litigated Patents
Pharma 112,396 5.83% 66 8.01%
Chemical 330,999 17.18% 67 8.13%
Electronic 549,965 28.54% 123 14.93%
Mechanical 708,983 36.79% 430 52.18%
Other 224,598 11.66% 138 16.75%
Total 1,926,941 100.00% 824 100.00%
Note: Patents for German population reported in PATDPA with application date from
1978 to 1993
settlement less likely. Only 8.13share of chemical patents in the total German pop-
ulation of patents is more than twice as high. It is relatively easy to detect the
imitation of chemical raw materials and this makes the outcomes of litigation suits
easy to predict and, as a result, settlement more profitable. Again, this should also
hold true for pharmaceutical patents. However, pharmaceuticals are more likely to
be involved in litigation suits than chemical patents. Because this field includes
biotechnology, which was a relatively new technology in the period of investigation,
the share of pharmaceutical patents involved in disputes (8.01%) is higher than
the overall share (5.83%) would suggest. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2003) report
greater shares in Drugs and Other Health, in Chemical and Electronics within the
sample of all filed cases in the U.S. for the suit filing cohorts between 1978 and
1995 in comparison with Germany. Only mechanical patents have a higher share
in Germany within the sample of litigated patents. The reason lies partly in the
differences in patenting behavior between the two countries. Germany traditionally
has a higher percentage of the more traditional mechanical patents owned by small
and medium sized firms. The probability of litigation is c.p. higher when more
patents are in force. Case study evidence from the chemical industry reports that
large German chemical and pharmaceutical companies try to avoid patent litigation
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by offering credible settlement amounts and/or cross-licensing agreements.
Table 4.5 contains the distribution across age classes. The average age of a
litigated patent is 8.3 years. About one-third of litigated patents are less than
6 years old, and one-third is between 6 and 10 years old. There is no reliable
information on the average age of a patent in the universe of all German patents
in the period from 1993 to 1995. Therefore, these large shares of young litigated
patents can be caused by a general tendency to infringe and subsequently provoke
suits at an average age of 8.3 years. However, it may be that across all technology
classes the average age of a patent in force is around this figure, and age has no
impact on the probability of litigation.
Table 4.5: Age of Patents at Time of Filing in the Sample of Litigated Patents
Patent’s Age
(years from application date) Number of patents percent
0 to 5 255 30.95%
6 to 10 300 36.41%
11 to 15 216 26.21%
16 to 20 53 6.43%
no. of firms 824 100.00%
Note: The average age at the time of filing is 8.3 years
As described in section 3.3 the construction of the control group results in a
sample litigation rate of 0.5. Table 4.6 shows how this litigation rate varies among
the groups of ownership and for different citation figures. German owners are more
likely to be involved in litigation than owners from abroad. The probability of
litigation decreases as the geographical distance from Germany increases. The last
column of table 4.6, “Total” shows that the German patent owners in the sample
face a sample litigation rate of 0.58, while that of all foreigners is below 0.5. Patents
with less than 4 forward citations have sample litigation rates lower than 0.5. While
Germans still face a probability of 0.48 within this sample patentees from outside
the triad are only involved in 0.15 (Japan) and 0.11 of disputes. This table confirms
that the litigation rate rises with the number of forward citations, which points to
a higher probability of litigation for more valuable patents. For patents owned by
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Germans this effect is monotone in the number of citations while for EU owners
and patentees from other countries it is not. Irrespective of the origin of the owner,
in cases where the number of forward citations is higher than nine the probability
of litigation is at least 15 percentage points greater than the constructed litigation
probability. In table 4.7 I show the sample litigation rates for patentees of different
absolute size owning patent portfolios of various sizes. In general large firms have a
sample litigation probability which is less than the average, 0.44. However, if the firm
owns a large portfolio with more than 2,000 patents, this probability drops further
to 0.20. Small firms have a high expected probability of litigation. For firms with a
small patent portfolio of ten patents at most, the probability of litigation amounts
to 0.80. Surprisingly, medium-sized firms with a large portfolio have a very high
observed probability of litigation (0.70), while firms with a smaller patent portfolio
do not significantly deviate from 50 percent. This number is mainly determined by
multiple cases of one company defending various patents.
4.4.2 Results from Probit Estimation
In this section I present the results of the probit analysis. I assume that the prob-
ability of litigation, given that patent infringement has taken place and has been
detected, is correlated to the value of the relevant intellectual property right (first
block of Table 4.8) a number of characteristics of the owner of the right, and mar-
ket characteristics (second block of Table 4.8). FORW CIT D+E is positive and
highly significant and shows that an increasing number of forward citations leads to
a higher sample probability of litigation at a decreasing rate indicated by a negative
parameter of FORW CIT D+E SQU. This result confirms H1.1 and is in line with
the findings of Lanjouw and Schankerman (2003), related studies by Graham and
Somaya (2004) for software patents and Harhoff and Reitzig (2004) for determinants
of opposition against pharmaceuticals. Adding one additional citation would raise
the litigation probability by 4.5 percentage points.26
26I used citations per claim in a different probit specification. In doing so I assigned more
attention to the valuation of a certain inventive step documented in one claim. The results remained
qualitatively the same and were in the magnitude of those of Lanjouw and Schankerman (2003).
However, the estimation was not as precise as the one preferred in this analysis and is not reported
here.
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Table 4.6: Probability of Litigation by Ownership and Forward Citations
Forward Citation
Owner from 0 1 – 3 4 – 7 7 – 9 more than 9 Total Obs
Germany 0.48 0.57 0.74 0.78 0.88 0.58 1100
(0.50) (0.50) (0.44) (0.42) (0.33) (0.49)
EU 0.21 0.59 0.78 1.00 0.71 0.42 287
(0.41) (0.50) (0.42) (0.00) (0.49) (0.49)
US 0.27 0.26 0.65 1.00 0.78 0.34 159
(0.45) (0.44) (0.49) (0.00) (0.44) (0.48)
Japan 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.67 0.16 77
(0.36) (0.32) (0.41) (0.58) (0.37)
other 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.12 25
(0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33)
Total 0.38 0.52 0.72 0.80 0.85 (0.50) 1648
(0.49) (0.50) (0.45) (0.40) (0.36) (0.50)
Obs 793 542 159 60 94 1648
Table shows the probability of litigation in the constructed sample depending on the origin of the
patent owner and the number of forward citations. When the probability of litigation is equal 1 (0)
there are only observations in either the group of litigated (unlitigated) patents. Standard errors
in parentheses.
BACKW CIT D+E has a positive impact on the likelihood of litigation processes
in Germany. This effect is estimated precisely and turns out to be robust against
sample variation. One additional backward citation added to the mean would in-
crease the probability of litigation by 4.7 percent points. This effect is in the same
dimension as that observed for forward citations and is highly significant. The im-
pact of backward citations on the likelihood of patent litigation diminishes as the
number of backward citations increases, a fact illustrated by a negative parameter
for BACKW CIT D+E SQU. The result suggests that a high number of backward
citations indicate either that the patent is probably either questionable because of
its similarity to a large number of previously granted patents or that the value of
the patent rises, as I argued in section 4.2.2. According to H1.2 I found evidence
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Table 4.7: Probability of Litigation by Portfolio Size and Firm Size of the Patentee
Size Classes of Patentees
Patent Portfolio Individual Small Medium-Sized Large Total Obs
0 to 10 0.32 0.80 0.56 0.52 0.53 634
(0.47) (0.40) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
11 to 250 0.12 0.70 0.54 0.53 0.53 633
(0.32) (0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
251 to 1000 0.00 0.33 0.59 0.51 0.51 152
(0.00) (0.52) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
1001 to 2000 0.57 0.50 0.42 0.45 65
(0.53) (0.53) (0.50) (0.50)
> 2000 0.43 0.70 0.20 0.29 164
(0.53) (0.47) (0.40) (0.46)
Total 0.27 0.73 0.55 0.44 0.50 1648
(0.45) (0.44) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Obs 274 294 497 583 1648
Table shows the probability of litigation in the constructed sample depending on the size of the
patent owner and the number of patents in its portfolio. When the probability of litigation is equal
1 (0) there are only observations in either the group of litigated (unlitigated) patents. Standard
errors in parentheses.
that this effect dominates the impact of lowered uncertainty in the distinct field of
technology. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2003) found a negative effect of backward
citations on the probability of litigation of patents in the U.S. Harhoff and Reitzig
(2004) described no significant effect of the total number of backward citations on
the likelihood of opposition at the European Patent Office for pharmaceuticals but
point out that the composition matters considerably.27 The more claims a patentee
27Harhoff and Reitzig (2004) found a significant positive effect of X documents. Because the
information on the shares of X and A is not available for German references, only the pure number
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has declared the higher the probability of litigation would appear to be. One claim
added to the mean of CLAIM raises this probability by 0.6 percentage points. This
result confirms H1.4. It is a small but precisely estimated parameter and is again
in line with the similar estimation of Lanjouw and Schankerman (2003).
Moreover, patents with a large family size prove to be more likely to be involved
in infringement suits. The effect of FAMILY SIZE on the probability of litigation
is positive and highly significant. One additional designated state as new family
member would raise the probability of litigation by 0.8 percentage points for the
sample. These results do not allow the rejection of H1.3. Regarding the impact
of family size on the likelihood of opposition, Harhoff and Reitzig (2004) found a
nonlinear effect which is not apparent in this infringement analysis. As referred
to earlier the value correlates are all positively correlated with the probability of
litigation and are in the line with previous research.
The parameters of the patentee’s characteristics are displayed in the second block.
The probability of an infringement suit falls as the PATENT PORTFOLIO in-
creases, as anticipated in H3. I also prove that the effect increases as the number
of patents in the portfolio grows. This is consistent with the results of Lanjouw
and Schankerman (2003) and the argument that experience in holding and enforc-
ing patent rights has a positive effect on the ability to settle. Additionally, as they
argue, there are “beneficial” enforcement spillovers “among patents within a given
firm.” The ability to settle is much greater for larger firms with bigger patent port-
folios. Adding 100 patents to the mean portfolio size of 1,590 decreases the sample
litigation rate by 2.3 percentage points. Table 4.9 displays a different specification
showing the effects of patent portfolio size in 5 classes. The probability of litiga-
tion clearly falls as the number of patents in the portfolio increase. This effect is
significant for German patent owners.
In order to test H4 the variables INDIVIDUAL, SMALL FIRM,
MEDIUM SIZE FIRM, and LARGE FIRM are used to indicate the absolute
size of the patentee as a determinant of patent litigation. Using INDIVIDUAL
as its base category, Table 4.8 and table 4.9 show that regardless of their size
of citations was used here. A detailed investigation such as undertaken by Harhoff and Reitzig
(2004) using X, Y and A citations would reveal more about the questioning or strengthening
properties of backward citations. This is especially important for German applications where such
distinctions are not as yet documented.
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Table 4.8: Probit Estimation Specification: Probability of Patent Litigation
Parameter Marginal Effect Parameter Marginal Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FORW CIT D 0.112∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006)
FORW CIT D+E SQU −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
BACKW CIT D+E 0.118∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.012) (0.031) (0.012)
BACKW CIT SQU −0.005∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
CLAIMS 0.015∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
FAMILY SIZE 0.020∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003)
PATENT PORTFOLIO −0.573∗∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗ −0.577∗∗∗ −0.230∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.062) (0.159) (0.063)
PATENT PORTFOLIO SQU 0.060∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.027) (0.027)
SMALL FIRM 1.134∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.034) (0.121) (0.035)
MEDIUM SIZE FIRM 0.682∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.039) (0.107) (0.040)
LARGE FIRM 0.706∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.040) (0.112) (0.042)
OWNER FOR EU −0.354∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.379∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.037) (0.101) (0.039)
OWNER FOR US −0.742∗∗∗ −0.278∗∗∗ −0.757∗∗∗ −0.284∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.041) (0.130) (0.043)
OWNER FOR JP −1.026∗∗∗ −0.356∗∗∗ −0.990∗∗∗ −0.349∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.050) (0.197) (0.053)
OWNER FOR Other −1.029∗∗∗ −0.352∗∗∗ −0.919∗∗∗ −0.326∗∗∗
(0.340) (0.082) (0.339) (0.092)
EPO APPL −0.126 −0.050 −0.132 −0.053
(0.098) (0.039) (0.102) (0.040)
PCT APPL −0.108 −0.043 −0.120 −0.048
(0.176) (0.070) (0.183) (0.073)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.8 – continued from previous page
Parameter Marginal Effect Parameter Marginal Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OPPOSITION 0.995∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.032)
CONSTANT −1.092∗∗∗ −1.091∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.112)
Wald-statistic (χ2(degrees of freedom))
Size variables 81.86(3)∗∗∗ 92.77(3)∗∗∗
Ownership variables 58.60(4)∗∗∗ 62.19(4)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.22
Obs. 1648 1648
Notes: Dependent Variable: Patent Litigation (0/1). The reference patent is owned by
an Individual from Germany. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate that the
parameter is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% significance level.
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Table 4.9: Probit Estimation Specification: Probability of Patent Litigation Using Patent Portfolio
Classes
Parameter Marginal Effect
(1) (2)
FORW CIT D 0.098∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.006)
FORW CIT D+E SQU −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
BACKW CIT D+E 0.102∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.013)
BACKW CIT SQU −0.006∗∗
(0.002)
CLAIMS 0.015∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002)
FAMILY SIZE 0.016∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.008) (0.003)
PATENT PORT 11-250 −0.306∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.033)
PATENT PORT 251-1000 −0.330∗∗ −0.130∗∗
(0.138) (0.053)
PATENT PORT 1001-2000 −0.400∗∗ −0.157∗∗
(0.188) (0.070)
PATENT PORT >2000 −0.668∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.063)
FOREIGN*PORTFOLIO 0.012 0.005
(0.246) (0.098)
DOMESTIC*PORTFOLIO −0.130∗ −0.052∗
(0.070) (0.028)
SMALL FIRM 1.186∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.034)
MEDIUM SIZE FIRM 0.755∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.041)
LARGE FIRM 0.816∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.045)
OWNER FOR EU −0.419∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.039)
OWNER FOR US −0.776∗∗∗ −0.291∗∗∗
Continued on next page
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Table 4.9 – continued from previous page
Parameter Marginal Effect
(1) (2)
(0.134) (0.044)
OWNER FOR JP −1.047∗∗∗ −0.365∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.054)
OWNER FOR Other −1.015∗∗∗ −0.351∗∗∗
(0.344) (0.086)
EPO APPL −0.126ion −0.050
(0.103) (0.041)
PCT APPL −0.213 −0.084
(0.184) (0.073)
OPPOSITION 1.011∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.032)
CONSTANT −1.002∗∗∗
(0.115)
Wald-statistic (χ2(degrees of freedom))
Size variables 92.12(3)∗∗∗
Ownership variables 56.45(4)∗∗∗
Portfolio variables 21.31(4)∗∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.23
Obs. 1648
Notes: Dependent Variable: Patent Litigation (0/1). PORTFOLIO SIZE is used as cat-
egorical variable in size classes. The reference patent is owned by an INDIVIDUAL from
Germany with PORTFOLIO SIZE of less than 11. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗,
∗∗∗ indicate that the parameter is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1%
significance level.
companies have a significantly higher probability of patent litigation than individual
patentees. This result is statistically significant. It provides no support for H4.
One explanation could be that individuals do, in fact, have high stakes in patent
litigation relative to their own wealth. However, the stakes are smaller in relation
to potential infringers and defendants which are likely to be large firms. Thus,
potential defendants might be large and have a lower probability to be involved
in litigation due to willingness to accept reasonable settlement offers. This does
not, however explain the contrast with the findings for the U.S. Firstly, differences
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in the litigation system between Germany and the U.S. may create different
incentives, especially for individuals. Due to cost rewarding rules and damage
calculation, individuals in Germany might be better off with relatively lower
settlement amounts compared to U.S. individual patentees and this may lead
to less litigation. Secondly, individuals on the German market might be more
pessimistic because of the financial burden a litigation case imposes and because of
the imperfect financial market, which leads to more settlement and less litigation
by individuals involved in such suits. As companies grow in size the chances of
them being involved in litigation decline. In other words, litigation is, c.p. in fact
most likely for small firms with turnover of less than 10 million DM compared to
other patentees. This result confirms H2 and is in the line with the results of the
studies referred to above. There is no monotonic relationship and the marginal
effect for MEDIUM SIZE FIRM is lower than for large firms. One explanation
might be, that for large firms it may be strategically advantageous not to settle
sometimes in order to signal a tough enforcement strategy against infringers.
Once a reputation as an aggressive plaintiff has been established more profitable
settlement agreements can be achieved in subsequent disputes.
The set of ownership variables in table 4.8 shows that foreign patent own-
ers as a whole have a lower propensity to file suit, though foreign owners from
the European Union are more likely to sue than U.S. or Japanese patentees.
The parameters of OWNER FOR EU, OWNER FOR US, OWNER FOR JP, and
OWNER FOR OTHER are significant and increase with geographical distance.
This is in line with the more general results of Lanjouw and Schankerman (2003)
and confirms the expectations outlined in section 4.2.2. The effects are large and
robust and show that foreign patentees have less chance of winning as a result of
their disadvantage as regards the evaluation of information. This leads to a lower
propensity to litigate (Priest and Klein 1984). I do not find support for an effect of
the path of seeking patent protection neither for PCT APPL nor for EPO APPL.
Hypotheses H1.5 has to be rejected. I find no significant difference in the likelihood
of litigation between patents originally filed as EPO or as German patents. As both
application paths confer German intellectual property rights, there is no jurisdic-
tional difference. All possible diversity is captured by the value correlates. As far
as the average date of patent application in the sample is concerned, this route of
seeking patent protection may not play an important role in influencing litigation
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probability. Although this indicator is shown to be correlated with the value of
patents.
I now turn to columns 3 and 4 of table 4.8. Patents that have survived an opposi-
tion procedure have a higher probability of litigation. The specification in columns
3 and 4 reveals that the expected probability of litigation for a patent in the sample
increases by 35.9 percentage points when an opposition has been filed, compared to
patents with the same characteristics that did not face opposition. This proves that
H1.6 cannot be rejected. The effect is considerable and estimated precisely. Besides
the parameters of FORW CIT D+E and Backw CIT D+E decrease the results are
fairly robust against this change. This result elucidates opposition as an indicator
of patent value and may partly explain some of the residual patent value (Harhoff
et al. 2003). After withstanding opposition the patentee’s position will be very
strong. The patentee can be fairly confident and can expect a high probability of
winning at trial which leads to more litigation (Priest and Klein 1984). The high
magnitude of the coefficient suggests that this variable not only reflects the higher
value of the patent, but, also gives the speciality of the procedure a higher weight.
An explanation might be that an opponent signals that the patent will be subject
to future infringement and subsequent disputes. If the patent is questionable from
the beginning of its granted life and is not revoked after an opposition, an infringing
action and subsequent infringement suit are more likely for it than for patents that
have not been under question through an opposition procedure. The results of the
analysis do not suggest that patents that have successfully withstood challenges are
less likely to produce costs and uncertainty during litigation suits (Graham et al.
2003).
In table 4.8 I estimated the effects of several patent and party characteristics on
the probability of filing a patent litigation suit using a sample of patent litigation
cases and a control group of the same size. But using the information of the patent
population and an estimation of all cases filed during this period of time 1993 to 1995
I am able to calculate the population probability of litigation.28 Similar to Lanjouw
and Schankerman (2003) I calculate the population probability of litigation for the
technical classes for which the sampling was non-random. Separate classes for the
cohorts are not needed because of the hypotheses that the litigation model applies to
28According to the argumentation in section 3.1 my sample contains about 60 percent of all
cases filed in Germany between 1993 and 1995.
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all cohorts. Table 4.10 reports the conversion factors for estimating the population
marginal effect.
The conversion factors in table 4.10 reveal that the population marginal effects
for chemical and electronic patents are lower in the population than in mechanical,
pharmaceutical and other. Changes in the patent’s and party’s characteristics are
linked with a smaller change in the probability of litigation than for mechanical
patents. The share of patents in the chemical field and the share of patents in the
electronic field are much higher in the population of all patents than in the sample
of litigated (and matched) patents. This is reflected in the conversion factors.
4.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter of the thesis I have presented an empirical analysis of the determi-
nants of patent litigation suits in Germany. It is the first study of its kind to be
undertaken for Germany. The information about the suits, the involved patents, and
the parties was obtained by searching written records held at the District Courts of
Mannheim and Du¨sseldorf between 1993 and 1995. The data set was complemented
by a search of the patent data bases of the German and European Patent Offices
and a number of corporate databases.
The multivariate probit analysis confirms that highly valuable patents are more
often the subject of infringement suits. It is not possible to observe whether such
patents have been infringed more frequently or whether they are more frequently
litigated before court. Using variables which were tested in prior work as highly
correlated with the value of the patent right turned out to have a positive impact
on the probability of litigation. In this way the results confirm those of Lanjouw
and Schankerman (2003). However, value correlates such as many forward citations,
large family sizes and a high number of claims point to a higher risk of involvement
in an infringement suit. Suits are less likely if the parties are able to settle on jus-
tifiable costs. Patent owners with a large portfolio of previous patents may have
experience in defending patents and giving them a protecting belt of patents around
the potentially infringed one. Additionally, they can use the large portfolio as bar-
gaining chips in licensing negotiations. The differences regarding backward citations
are possibly due to their different composition. At this point further research must
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Table 4.10: Conversion Factors to Estimate Population Marginal Effects
Without Opposition Opposition Included
(1) (2)
Pharmaceutical 0.018 0.018
Chemical 0.008 0.007
Electronic 0.007 0.007
Mechnical 0.019 0.019
Other 0.019 0.019
Notes: The conversion factors are calculated as described in Appendix 4.6.
be conducted to investigate the impact of the characteristics inherent to the U.S.
and German patent and litigation systems so that the results can be compared. I
further conclude, that an opposition prior to a suit is a signal of potential further
potential infringement and subsequent disputes. I do not expect that opposition
with possibly amending results for the patent claims to reduce the propensity to
litigate.
Characteristics of the patentee, such as his or her ability to interact repeatedly
and his experience in exploiting and enforcing patents, measured by patent portfolio
size lead to significantly lower probabilities of litigation. A credible threat to file a
suit, measured in absolute size (sales or employees) of the plaintiff, has a negative
impact on the filing rate within the sample. Evidence was also found that small
firms tend to have a higher risk of getting involved in suits. At this point it is
not clear whether this is due to the relatively high profits these firms expect from
their invention or whether there is some kind of self serving bias (Babcock and
Loewenstein 1997). This bias would lead these firms to form their expectations
towards higher rates of winning at trial and higher gains from suits. However the
costs of such suits will harm the small firms more seriously and may well lead to
financial distress. Additionally, the uncertainty during the course of the case will
cause further losses. This will have a decisiveimpact on the cost of insurance to
cover litigation risks. A detailed analysis of the course of the cases will lead to more
insight. It is somewhat satisfying that in contrast to the empirical findings for the
U.S., the propensity of individuals to be involved in patent litigation is relatively
low compared with companies as a result of individuals’ lack of experience, high
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monitoring efforts, and typically weaker financial background. This is evident in
equal measure for both domestic and foreign individual patentees.
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4.6 Appendix Chapter 4
Population Litigation Probability
Due to the sampling algorithm the overall litigation probability within the sample
of litigated and matched non-litigates patents is 50 percent. In order to calculate
the real population probability of litigation I have to inflate the matched sample for
a given class to have it reflect the number of non-litigated patents in that class in
the population.
I define classes of patents using the characteristics with respect to which the
sampling was not random. This characteristic is the 4-digit IPC. Again following
Lanjouw and Schankerman, separate classes for cohorts are not necessary because I
assume that the litigation model applies to all cohorts. Let P (Xc) be the population
probability of litigation for a patent with characteristics Xc) belonging to class c,
and let S(Xc) denote the probability of litigation within the sample of litigated and
matched non-litigates patents. Following Lanjouw and Schankerman I want to infer
P (Xc) from the estimated S(Xc).
Let L and M denote the number of litigated and and matched patents in the
sample, and N the number of non-litigated patents in the class in the population.
First, I calculate the aggregate sample probability and population probability, S
and P respectively.
S =
L
L+M
P =
L
N
The number of litigated patents L is the same for in both equations.
N =
S
(1− S)PM = IM
The distribution of matched patent characteristics is the same as the population.
Thus the expected number of matched patents is with characteristics Xc is IM(Xc)
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greater than in the sample by the inflation factor I. Similarly, L(Xc) is the number
of litigated patents with characteristics Xc. Following that, the expected population
probability of litigation for a patent in class c is
P (Xc) =
L(Xc)
IM(Xc)
while the expected sample probability of litigation for a patent in class c is
S(Xc) =
L(Xc)
L(Xc) +M(Xc)
Substituting M leads to
P (Xc) =
S(Xc)
I(1− S(Xc)
Marginal Effects for the Population
The marginal effect for each characteristic Xk is
∂P (Xc)
∂Xkc
=
dP (Xc)
dS(Xc)
∂S(Xc)
∂(Xkc)
While the last term is the sample marginal effect from the probit regression I
resolve the first term at the right hand side as following:
dP (Xc)
dS(Xc)
≈ P
S(1− S)
For P I divide the number of litigated patents in a class by the number of patents
in the same class. I corrected the number of litigated patents for the missing cases
from the other District Courts (around 30 percent are not reported in Mannheim
and Du¨sseldorf) and the missing cohorts by using the figures of Stauder (1989).
Assuming that the probability of litigation has no time trend during 1977 to 1995
I adjusted the number by the growth rate of patent applications at the EPO. The
sample marginal effects of each class can be converted to population marginal effects
by dP (Xc)/dS(Xc).
Chapter 5
Settlement During Patent Trials
5.1 Introduction
Conflicts in the enforcement of patent rights can be resolved privately or they may
escalate into legal suits. As the work of Lanjouw and Schankerman for the U.S.
and the results of Chapter 4 show, the decision to file a suit is mainly driven by
the characteristics of the parties and the patents involved. In this Chapter I explore
why patent litigation cases were settled and whether there are differences between
suits settled at different stages of the trial. The ongoing debate about the growing
number of litigation suits makes it interesting to assess to what extent the decision to
litigate already takes account for an anticipated settlement during this litigation suit
(Bessen and Meurer, 2005). For the purposes of establishing of a European patent
enforcement system it is crucial to learn more about the incentives driving the parties
to re-negotiate a settlement during trial. This Chapter illuminates certain detailed
characteristics which are of interest regarding the design of a European system.
While Somaya (2003) focuses on the importance of strategic stakes in disputes
in the U.S. enforcement system this Chapter addresses two factors which influence
the probability of settlement in German patent suits once the trial has started. The
first is whether the relative technological and size position of the parties might be an
important factor for the settlement decision. Even though the size and composition
of the patent portfolio is known at the beginning, once the suit has started these
positions might acquire different weight. The new situation within the legal dispute
causes a re-evaluation process since not only the absolute size but also the relation
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between the parties could now be of importance, as they are generally related to the
stakes involved in the suit. Farrell and Merges (2004) argue that skewed incentives
caused by skewed stakes will affect the expenditures for the case.1 The second
factor is how the legal environment and the legal instruments available to the parties
influence how they proceed further within the trial. I find that there are considerable
differences in the settlement rates between the regional District Courts of Mannheim
and Du¨sseldorf in a horizontal way and between the District Courts and the Higher
District Courts in a vertical sense. The first appeal (second instance) is handled by
the Higher District Court (“Oberlandesgericht”). Both the information of the first
instance outcome and the new constellation of the suit at the Higher District Court
are likely to affect the decision to settle or to go ahead with the trial in Germany.
The outline of the Chapter is as follows: In section 5.2, I present the theoretical
framework and the hypotheses. I introduce the sample and the variables in section
5.3. The descriptive and econometric results are discussed in section 5.4. Section
5.5 concludes.
5.2 Theoretical Considerations
As pre-trial bargaining is closely related to the settlement negotiations during the
legal dispute I rely on the literature on negotiation settlement. Three main mech-
anisms for non-settlement were formulated.2 First, uncertainty about the stakes
involved and the probability of winning may lead to diverging expectations (Priest
and Klein, 1984). In this line Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) argue that the self
serving bias is a common source of diverging expectations. Parties form their expec-
tations about their probabilities of winning by drawing from a known distribution
in a biased way and consequently overestimate their chances of winning.
Second, the existence of private information may lead to non-settlement (P’ng,
1983, Bebchuk, 1984, Meurer, 1989). Bebchuk (1984) investigated the information
conditions which determine the probability of certain outcomes of general legal dis-
putes. He constructed a model where one party has detailed information on the
winning probability while the other only knows the density function of the winning
1See also Hylton (2002).
2Daughety and Reinganum (2004) give an overview of the economic foundations of settlement.
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probability. The better informed party reveals its expectations based on its informa-
tion to the less informed one. The failure to settle follows firstly from the asymmetry
of information and secondly from the unfavorable information the uninformed party
has. Patent litigation cases where the parties have symmetric information about
winning probabilities and size of the case but asymmetric information about valid-
ity of the property right are subject of Meurer (1989). His approach can be used to
sketch a bargaining game which shows the decision to be made in a German legal
dispute on intellectual property rights.
Third, asymmetric stakes tend to hamper settlement because one party thinks
that it has more to win than the other party has to lose at trial. Institutional
variation such as different rules for cost shifting and contingency fees and their
impact on the incidence of trials are discussed by Shavell (1982), Reinganum and
Wilde (1986), and Farmer and Pecorino (2005b). Farmer and Pecorino (2005a) show
that asymmetric information can be overcome by a complementary use of mandatory
discovery and voluntary disclosure. The welfare of both parties will be enhanced
depending on the costs linked to the information transmission procedure.
These approaches assess solely the decision of one party to settle or to proceed
in trial at one point in time before the trial has begun. Even though they describe
several stages of the litigation process they do not investigate repeated interaction of
the parties deciding about settlement at particular stages. An exception is the model
of P’ng (1983) which explicitly includes later settlements in the bundle of mixed
strategies. He models the multiple stages of the patent litigation dispute (pre-trial,
during trial, out-of-court negotiations leading to settlements) in detail. He assumes
incomplete and asymmetric information which leads to settlement agreements and
proceeded trials even though the expected gain might be negative. These signaling
games are modelled in a setting with complete and symmetric information. The
delay of settlement after the decision to file a suit must be driven by new information
or by a different evaluation of previously known information. All information about
the characteristics of the patent and the patentee is available at the time the parties
decide to go to trial or to settle before any legal action has been started. However,
the changing evaluation and the changing importance of certain information might
be more decisive once the trial has started. These changes in information status
are discussed in the following and form the main focus of interest of the subsequent
analysis.
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As the discussion above shows the information structure and the distribution of
stakes between the parties are the most important elements which drive the negoti-
ations. Equally important is the kind of processing these information because this
may lead to different expectations about the outcomes of the dispute - qualitatively
and quantitatively. The analysis below tries to shed light on how legal circumstances
might affect the pure economic incentives of decision making.
5.2.1 Hypotheses
I use the general structure of a litigation process, as shown in Figure 5.1 to outline
a set of crucial decisions to be made by the parties regarding the issue of whether to
proceed with the trial or not. For the analysis in this Chapter I take six steps into
account: 1. settlement prior to oral hearings at the District Court (first instance), 2.
settlement subsequent to oral hearings at the District Court, 3. continuation through
to a court decision by the District Court, 4. continuation to the Higher District
Court (second instance), 5. settlement prior to the decision of the Higher District
Court, 6. continuation to a decision taken by the Higher District Court.3 Recall
that all information about the patent characteristics, the parties and the market
situation is used to decide whether to file a suit or not (Lanjouw and Schankerman,
2003). I do not expect this information to determine the outcome of the trial in
later stages. Existing information may be re-evaluated to some extent, but I do
not expect these characteristics to have a significant effect on the probability of
settlement after the suit has started. I implicitly assume in this analysis that there
is no strategic behavior in this bargaining.
New Information
New information emerging during the actions of litigation suits may affect settlement
at later stages of the suit. Two sources of new information arise. The first is the
3I do not analyze the probability of winning as such because no decision about the validity of
the patent is made in the District Courts. In patent suits at German District Courts the validity
of the patent is assumed and only the infringing action is evaluated in respect to the patent claims.
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Figure 5.1: Detailed Structure of an Infringement Dispute and Sample Description
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opinion of the court during the motions of the first instance. A court decision at
the District Court reveals the quality of the case depending on whether the plaintiff
prevails or not. Second, the first appeal will be brought to the Higher District Court
where the case is re-examined. Whether the plaintiff prevailed at the District Court
or not is decisive for the parties deciding whether to proceed or not to the next
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instance. They will evaluate this information by accepting the court’s decision or
not. After they have decided to proceed to the first appeal the potential settlement
decision at this stage will not be affected by the court judgement of the previous
stage of trial.
However, parties will re-evaluate the stakes involved in the case at the beginning
of the second stage. The parties have incurred costs as a result of the trial and the
uncertainty about the outcome of trial may affect the expected value of the patent.
These factors lead to a new assessment of the settlement value which both parties
would find acceptable.4I do not therefore expect settlement behavior to be dependent
on the judgement of the District Court, but I do expect a re-evaluation process of
the stakes involved in the case which would lead to an impact of the patent value on
the settlement decision. As I am not able to observe if the plaintiff or the defendant
initiates the settlement, there is an ambiguous correlation between the value of the
patent and the probability of settlement at the second stage. Additionally, I assume
that the incentives to settle not only differ with the size of the stakes but also with
the size of the parties. Small firms are faced with higher litigation costs relative to
their financial resources than larger companies.
Legal Steps
Uncertainty during trials is frequently enhanced by the means the defendant chooses
to attack the patent’s validity. Such an invalidity suit will be filed to the Federal
Patent Court. The defendant signals that (s)he expects a declaration of invalidity of
the patent. The uncertainty about the validity of the patent which is to be decided
by the Federal Patent Court may influence the expectations of the patentee about
chances to win in the infringement case. The more likely it is that the patent will
be declared invalid the more likely is a settlement in the infringement suit.
H1: Suits in which defendants use an invalidity procedure as a means of defense
will be settled more frequently than cases without.
4Pitz (1999) reports that frequently agreements will be reached at later stages of a dispute
because the parties know a lot more about the strength of their position and their technological
perspective. Not all options the parties have would have been considered at the beginning of the
battle and this only partly because they would not have been available at this point.
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An opposition procedure after the issuance of a patent questions the novelty of
a patent, i.e. whether it constitutes an inventive step. If a patent has survived
this procedure, possibly with an amendment of claims, it will appear to be more
valuable. As a result settlement becomes less likely from the position of the patentee.
Additionally, it is proven for a second time that the patent is valid. Patentees will be
very confident in their expectation of winning the suit. Another argument follows a
more jurisdictional interpretation: Opposition against a patent indicates a litigious
situation where the patent is questioned from the beginning of the patent’s term.
Opposition leads to a higher risk of involvement in litigation suits and this might
indicate a willingness to argue pending a decision by a legal authority thus preventing
settlement being reached (Cremers, 2004).
H2: Suits in which the patent survived an opposition procedure before filing are
less likely to be settled early.
I implicitly assume that the patentee (plaintiff) has a large amount of room to
move within this negotiation game. He can not only offer settlements or react to
the defendant’s settlement offer but can also simply bring the case to an end. In
other words, if the defendant does not accept an offer, the plaintiff might drop the
case. Hypothesis 2 depends on this assumption that the plaintiff is the more active
part in the settlement negotiations.
Characteristics of the patents and the parties
The decision to litigate or not is determined by the characteristics. These may have
an impact on the decision to settle during the suit or not. However, I do not expect
a systematic pattern for all characteristics and value correlates. All information
about them are already known at the time when litigation starts and used for the
decision to litigate or not.
I expect no significant impact of the value correlates of a patent on the probability
of settlement at later stages of a patent suit.
However, I expect that the time left to realize the expected payoff from a patented
invention has an effect on the settlement probability during trial. In cases,
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where the time a patent will be further in force is long (a young patent), a
trial will be less likely to be settled than suits where the patent involved will
lapse into the public domain more quickly after the suit. That in turn means
that suits where patents are older will be settled earlier than those suits where
the patent is younger and will probably in force for many years. The expected
payoff will be higher simply by having more time to realize it after the suit
will be closed. This would be in line to hypothesis H1 in the previous chapter.
Similar arguments as for the patent characteristics hold for those of the parties,
such as size of the plaintiff of defendant and the country of origin. Since all infor-
mation about the litigants are available at the time of the decision to litigate, I do
not expect a significant impact of the those party characteristics on the probability
to settle at a certain stage of the suit.
5.2.2 Previous Empirical Work
The analysis of the determinants of settlement failure after detection of infringement
has been undertaken extensively for the US (Lanjouw and Lerner, 1996 and 1998,
Lanjouw, 1998; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001 and 2003; Ziedonis, 2003; Llobet,
2003; Somaya, 2003). Due to data constraints there is little published empirical
research for Europe available (Stauder, 1989; Cremers, 2004.) The three mechanisms
for settlement failure sketched above were partly validated in empirical studies.
Studies for the U.S. distinguish between suits dealing with attacks on validity and
suits claiming an infringed patent. In Germany the District Courts presume validity
of the infringed patent as long as no annulment suit has been filed at the Federal
Patent Court (“Bundespatentgericht”).
Seminal empirical investigations of determinants of patent suits have been com-
piled by Lanjouw and Schankerman(2001 and 2003) who show a strong positive
impact of the expected value of a patent on the probability of litigation. Further-
more, they report a higher settlement probability in cases where the patentee’s
portfolio is very large. A specific investigation of the semiconductor industry has
been undertaken by Ziedonis (2003). Lanjouw and Schankerman (2003) focus on
the determinants of patent litigation and they investigate outcomes of cases and
the timing of eventual settlement. They find, that the probability of being involved
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in patent suit in the U.S. is very heterogenous. For individuals or companies with
small patent portfolios the probability of litigation suits is much higher than for
patentees with large portfolios. Lanjouw and Schankerman interpreted their results
in the way that cooperative interaction induced by patents to trade induce more
pre-trial settlements. The analysis of these authors reveals a detailed picture of the
U.S. patent enforcement system. The heterogeneity of the European patent enforce-
ment system contrary to a harmonized European patent granting system and raises
the question whether this peculiarity causes a different pattern of the probability of
patent litigation for certain patentees.
Trajtenberg (1990) and Harhoff et al. (2003a) stress the need to take account of
the strategic aspects of patenting when assessing the value of patents, and not only
the rents achieved by exploiting the patented innovation exclusively. This includes
signaling technological capacities, blocking competitor’s development of new prod-
ucts and building portfolios of patents as bargaining chips (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001),
and as patent thickets protecting major inventions (Shapiro, 2001a; Hall, 2003).
The study of Harhoff and Reitzig (2004) focuses on the analysis of the determi-
nants of opposition procedures against EPO patent grants. Opposition is an early
form of patent dispute. Contrary to litigation suits they directly attack the validity
of the opposed patent. Additionally, unlike litigation suits there is no direct dispute
between the opposing and opposed party but a negotiation between the patent office
and the opposed party. However, this study and an investigation of patent litiga-
tion in Germany (Cremers, 2004) demonstrate that the value of the stakes included
in the suit, namely the patent value and the expected payoffs of the suit, have a
positive impact on the probability of non-settlement - i.e.that cases will be filed
and brought to trial. The differences in the characteristics of the parties lead to
diverging expectations about the value and the market payoffs.
Perloff et al. (1996) performed the first study of trial outcomes and settlement
not involving individuals but firms. However, their focus is on testing whether
risk aversion plays a role in determining the litigation rates (self selection) and
settlement outcomes. For the outcomes of patent trials Lanjouw and Schankerman
(2001) and (2003) and Somaya (2003) find that most of the factors correlated with
the probability of settlement before the trial do not have any significant effect on
the settlement probability once the trial has started. The choice of the court and
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the correspondence among the parties and the court provide credible knowledge
about the merits of the case and the stakes involved. Rational behavior will likely
promote realistic expectations about the outcome of the trial. However, Lanjouw
and Schankerman (2003) analyze the winning probability in certain technical areas
and estimate settlement probability during trial. They find that more than 80% of
all settlements occur before the pre-trial hearing and that the post-trial settlement
does not significantly vary with portfolio size or ownership of the patents.
A more detailed analysis of different outcomes (settlement or court decisions at
certain stages of a patent suit) is conducted by Somaya (2003). He investigates the
impact of the strategic stakes the parties have in a litigation suit. These strategic
stakes are measured for the patentee as the number of self citations of the litigated
patent. For the non-patentee, the number of his citations to all citations is used as
a measure of the strategic stakes. Somaya finds that the respective stakes matter
in varying degrees for the computer and research medicine industries as far as the
decision to proceed the trial or to settle is concerned.5
In the previous studies the reported empirical results with respect to the strategic
stakes are ambiguous. Somaya (2003) reports a positive impact of strategic stakes on
the probability to proceed to trial until a court judgement. The same interpretation
is given by Fournier and Zuehlke (1989) who report a negative effect of costs on the
settlement probability. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2003) find that the main charac-
teristics of the patents and the patentees affect neither the probability of settlement
nor the plaintiff’s win rate in trials. The study by Perloff et al. (1996) reports that
risk aversion plays an important role in explaining settlement in antitrust suits.6
They also argue that the outcomes of antitrust trials vary between certain jurisdic-
tions owing to the existence of different legal rules in different jurisdictions, different
enforcement of similar rules, or different attitudes toward plaintiffs on the part of
judges. For the U.S. patent system, Farrell and Merges (2004) show that litigation is
not a reliable tool to verify patent validity. Asymmetric stakes of the parties imply
5In the sample of Somaya (2003) research medicine includes patents from biotechnology, drug
delivery systems, assays and dental innovation. The sample of computer patents contains semi-
conductors, data storage, computer systems, I/O devices, computer applications, and networking
technologies.
6They find that a change in the winning probability at trial towards 0.5 increases the variance
and this in turn leads to an increase in pre-trial settlements.
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skewed incentives to litigate and lead to high expenditures on litigation processes
which influence the winning probabilities. Farrell and Merges (2004) argue that the
efforts depend highly on the stakes involved. If there are asymmetric stakes, the ef-
forts will be asymmetric and this shifts the probability of winning towards the party
with the relatively high stakes involved. A study predicting winning probabilities
in selected samples of litigation is presented by Waldfogel (1995). In detail, Marco
(2004) refers empirically to the selection problem and he finds considerable differ-
ences in the winning probabilities. I do not estimate the probability of plaintiff’s
win at trial since I do not have data which cover a time period sufficiently long to
estimate this precisely.
The empirical analysis of this Chapter is related to Somaya (2003). I test whether
the strategic aspects of patent right enforcement play a role in the determination of
settlement during trial or not. Furthermore I investigate the impact of early stage
success of failure of the plaintiff on later stage settlement rates.
5.3 Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Based on the data I introduced in Chapter 3 I use the sample of all litigated
patents. The overall settlement rate during the course of the patent litigation
suits in this sample is 55.6%. In detail I can observe settlement before the first
oral hearing (SETTLE BEF HEARING), after the hearing during the first instance
(SETTLE DISTRICT) and during the second instance at the Higher District Court
(SETTLE HIGH DISTRICT). Figure 5.1 shows that of the 824 suits, 171 (20,8%)
are settled before the first oral hearing.7 This is slightly more than half of those
settled during the first instance, 317 (38%). A court ruling is reached in 507 cases
in which the winning rate of the patentee is 75%. More than half of the decisions
were not accepted by at least one of the parties involved and were brought before
a second instance court. Of the 125 patentees who lost in the first instance court,
54 (43.2accept and the other 71 (56.8%) proceeded further by trial. The settlement
rate at the second instance, at 49,5%, is significantly higher than at the first stage.
In cases where a case comes to a court decision at the Higher District Court the
7Somaya (2003) reports a much higher settlement rates of 78% and 62% for computer and
research medicine patents in the U.S. respectively.
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patentee win rate (30%) is much lower.8
Table 5.1: Course of the Case in Mannheim and Du¨sseldorf
District Court Higher District Court
Overall Du¨sseldorf Mannheim Overall Du¨sseldorf Mannheim
(1) Filed suits 824 638 186 272 235 37
(2a) Settled bef. Hearing 171 147 24
Share of (1) 21% 23% 13%
(2b) Settled after Hearing 146 86 60
Share of (1)-(2a) 22% 17% 37%
(2) Settled suits 317 233 84 135 123 12
Share of (1) 38% 37% 45% 50% 55% 32%
(3) Suits adjudicated 507 405 102 137 112 25
Share of (1) 62% 63% 55% 50% 48% 68%
(4) Plaintiff’s won 382 306 76 47 36 11
Share of (3) 75% 76% 75% 34% 32% 44%
Notes: Observations are the number of patents proceeded to the court decision at either
court.
Additional to Figure 5.1, Table 5.1 reports the differences among District Courts
regarding the settlements at the two stages of the suit. Surprisingly the settlement
rate before the first hearing (13%) in Mannheim is much lower than in Du¨sseldorf
(26%) while the opposite is the case after hearing (17% in Du¨sseldorf and 37%
in Mannheim). As the first oral hearing in Du¨sseldorf, unlike at Mannheim, has
no decisive character in terms of adjudication, I would expect fewer suits to be
settled compared to the procedure in Mannheim, where the first oral hearing already
goes into the merits of the case. However, the settlement rate during the first
instance trial is generally higher in Mannheim than in Du¨sseldorf which leads to
fewer cases (absolute and relative) reaching the second instance in Mannheim. This
may be due to the fact that the Du¨sseldorf District Court is regarded as more
pro-patentee or because the suits brought to the Du¨sseldorf court might involve
more uncertainty about the outcome. The winning rates do not differ considerably
between the courts.
8Since the trial at the second appeal (third instance) will only verify whether the jurisdictional
issues are handled correctly, I incorporated it into the data of the first appeal.
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Table 5.2: Settlement Rates by Technical Areas
Settlement Rate
Area District Court Higher District Court
(1) (2)
DRUG 0.42 0.67
CHEM 0.49 0.39
ELEC 0.39 0.59
MECH 0.35 0.57
OTHER 0.39 0.24
Total 0.38 0.51
OBS 824 272
Notes: OBS is the number of cases at District Court (first in-
stance) are all suits filed (Column (1)). In column (2) is OBS the
number of patents which were proceeded to the Higher District
Court (first appeal) after the first adjudication.
I grouped the disputed patents into five technological areas: pharmaceuticals
(DRUG), chemical patents (CHEM), electronic patents (ELEC) including comput-
ers, mechanical patents (MECH) and those from other technologies (OIPC).9 Look-
ing at different industries involved into these suits the settlement rates vary remark-
ably. Table 5.2 shows that at the first instance DRUG patent suits are settled in
42% of the cases while owners of MECH patents come to an agreement with the
litigant less often (35%). This confirms the result of Cremers (2004) who shows
that the litigation rate for chemicals and drugs is lower than the average and far
lower than for mechanical patents. In other words, litigants in areas which are
highly litigious in the first place, such as MECH, are persistent in their aversion
to settlement. This may be due to the fact that for mechanical devices the burden
of proof of infringement is higher while, thanks to precise analytical methods, it is
easier to prove whether or not a CHEM or DRUG patent has been infringed. It is
important to keep in mind that there is no question about validity during the civil
suit of patent litigation. For suits which reached the second instance (first appeal)
the settlement rate is even higher. It suggests that at least one party has a strong
incentive to reach an agreement.10
9The classification follows Lanjouw and Lerner (1996).
10Somaya (2003) also reports interindustry differences of settlement decisions in the U.S.
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Table 5.3: Plaintiff Win Rates by Technical Areas
Area District Court Higher District Court
Observations Win Rate Observations Win Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DRUG 38 0.84 6 0.0
CHEM 34 0.74 11 0.36
ELEC 74 0.85 13 0.31
MECH 278 0.74 76 0.46
OTHER 83 0.68 31 0.13
TOTAL 507 0.75 137 0.34
Notes: Observations are the number of patents proceeded to the
court decision at either instance.
As Figure 5.1 shows, the overall win rate for plaintiffs (WIN PL) at the first
instance District Court is 75%. This figure is about the same as Waldfogel (1995)
reports for IPR cases. Detailed win rates for plaintiffs are reported in Table 5.3.
There is not much variation in the winning rates between technical areas or between
the two District Courts, Mannheim and Du¨sseldorf. However, differences can be
observed between the first and second instance. In both instances the win rate
diverges significantly from the 0.5 which is postulated by Priest and Klein (1984).
However, in the first instance at the District Courts it is remarkably higher than
this rate between 0.68 for OIPC and 0.85 for ELEC. It is possible that plaintiffs are
better at estimating their chances of winning disputes which are brought to trial
and that they drop cases or accept settlements before filing in those cases in which
they believe the probability of winning is too low. Another explanation of these
high winning rates may be that there is asymmetric information about the extent
to which the patent has been infringed. The assumed validity of the patent leaves
out all cases of probably invalid patents. The win rates at the second instance at
the Higher District Courts differ remarkably from those at the District Courts. The
average win rate is 0.34. Suits brought in Mannheim suits (0.44) are closer to 50 %
than the Du¨sseldorf suits with 0.32.
Table 5.4 summarizes the statistics of litigated patents in suits which were set-
tled at certain stages and Table A5.1 in the Appendix 5 contains a definition of the
variables. The first columns contains means and standard deviations of the main in-
dependent variables for all litigated patents. Columns (3) and (4) show the statistics
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Table 5.4: Description of Exogenous Variables by Stage of Settlement, Means (SD)
All litigated Patents Settled at District Court Settled at
Variable before Hearing after Hearing Higher District Court
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AGE PATENT 8.358 7.871∗∗ 8.637 9.021∗∗
(4.281) (4.196) (4.068) (4.330)
CLAIMS 10.500 12.959 9.130∗∗ 10.872
(9.621) (14.097) (6.583) (9.049)
FAMILY SIZE 5.576 5.930 4.993 5.142
(6.234) (5.155) (6.843) (5.702)
CIT D+E 3.412 3.919 3.106∗∗ 5.277∗∗∗
(5.378) (4.911) (4.308) (6.434)
REF D+E 3.430 3.520 3.589 4.043∗
(2.905) (2.491) (3.059) (3.505)
INDIV PL 0.262 0.175∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗ 0.199∗∗
(0.439) (0.381) (0.471) (0.400)
SMALL PL 0.188 0.187 0.185 0.220
(0.391) (0.391) (0.390) (0.416)
MEDIUM PL 0.286 0.368∗∗∗ 0.171 0.284
(0.452) (0.484) (0.378) (0.452)
LARGE PL 0.263 0.269 0.315∗ 0.300
(0.441) (0.444) (0.466) (0.459)
PORTFOLIO PL/1000 0.736 1.301∗∗ 0.626 0.447
(4.279) (4.356) (5.506) (2.519)
PORTFOLIO DF/1000 0.219 0.226 0.296 0.158
(1.440) (0.717) (1.593) (0.839)
RATIO PORTFOLIO 508.547 839.594 548.851 279.444
(4085.170) (4073.611) (5505.392) (2502.836)
OWNERSHIP DE 0.771 0.731∗ 0.774 0.794
(0.421) (0.445) (0.420) (0.406)
OWNERSHIP EU 0.146 0.140 0.144 0.142
(0.353) (0.348) (0.352) (0.350)
OWNERSHIP NEU 0.084 0.129 0.082 0.064
(0.277) (0.336) (0.276) (0.245)
NULLITY 0.249 0.351∗∗∗ 0.260 0.482∗∗∗
(0.433) (0.479) (0.440) (0.501)
OPPOS 0.271 0.286 0.233 0.262
(0.445) (0.453) (0.424) (0.441)
WIN PL 0.787
(0.035)
EPO 0.260 0.310 0.219 0.269
(0.439) (0.464) (0.415) (0.445)
PCT 0.031 0.035 0.041 0.028
(0.175) (0.185) (0.199) (0.167)
Observations 824 171 146 141
Notes: The number of patents litigated at District Court (first instance) are all patents involved in suits filed. Patents in
suits at the Higher District Court (Second instance) are suits which proceeded to the first appeal at Higher District Court
after the first adjudication at the District Court. Numbers with ∗∗∗,∗∗ or ∗ differ statistically significant at 1%, 5% or 10%
level from the sample mean (column (1)).
for all patents of which the dispute were settled at the first instance and the last two
columns, (5) and (6), report statistics for those patents for which the disputes were
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settled at the Higher District Court (second instance). The upper panel describes
the patent characteristics, the middle part the parties characteristics and the lower
one the legal variables. In the last two rows ”EPO” and ”PCT” are controls for the
route of application.
I include the age of the patent (AGE PATENT) as an indicator of the length of
time for which the patent has already been in force. It is defined as the number of
years from the application to the filing of the litigation. Age may reflect the time
period in which the patented invention could have produced a value for the patentee
and which could be lost due to infringement. It could also be an indicator of how
long the patent might be in force afterwards. Suits which are settled at the second
stage deal on average with older patents (9.021) than most of the patents in the
sample (8.358). The latter may provide information about the extent to which it
may be worthwhile to enter a dispute about the patent. The age of the patent is
an indicator of the payoff which can be expected after the trial. A patent is mainly
qualified by its claims (CLAIMS). The average number is 10 for the whole sample of
litigated patents. Patents for which the dispute was settled after the first instance
hearing have significantly fewer claims (9.13). FAMILY SIZE is defined as the
number of jurisdictions in which patent protection was sought. It conforms to the
definition of family size used by Putnam (1996). It is a measure of the importance
a patent has for the patentee him/herself. The mean of FAMILY SIZE is 5.576 and
does not vary among the groups of settled patent disputes. The number of citations
received from subsequent patent applications (CIT D+E) is calculated by searching
both patent databases (PATDPA and EPOLINE). I excluded double counts and
corrected for truncation bias.11 Citation correlates very closely to the value of the
patent. As I argued above (Cremers, 2004), it might also be an indicator that
the claims are similar to other inventions and that infringement therefore is more
likely. The numbers show that the patents in suits settled after the first instance
hearing have on average significantly fewer citations (3.106) than the patents not
settled at this stage while the mean number of citations at later stage settlements
is significantly higher (5.277). These figures reflect that more valuable patents are
more likely to go through the whole trial without reaching a settlement. The number
of references to prior patent applications (REF D+E) measure how the examiner
11See Hall et al. (2002) for a description of the methods regarding truncation biases in citation
data.
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and the patentee refer to prior art. These references can define the scope of the
patent by potential litigious older patents or support patentability by referring to
additional developments to earlier patents. Additional control variables are EPO or
PCT which indicate the way of seeking patent protection.
The characteristics of the patentee are described in the second panel of Table
5.4. Measures of absolute size are defined in size classes of individual, small firm,
medium sized firm and large firm. The distribution within the sample shows that
26% of the plaintiffs are individuals while small firms can be found less often within
the sample. Around half of plaintiffs are medium and large firms. I assume that
the characteristics of the companies relative to each other as well as absolute val-
ues may impede settlement. I therefore relate the portfolio sizes of the plaintiff
to the portfolio size of the defendant (RATIO PORTFOLIO). The average (RA-
TIO PORTFOLIO) is 508 for all litigated patents. RATIO PORTFOLIO reflects
that parties with higher technological power compared to the defending party are
more often represented in the group of early settling parties than in those which
settle at the second stage. Although the difference appears to be high in magni-
tude, it is not statistically significant. The plaintiffs are on average much larger in
terms of patent portfolio than their counterparts in disputes. This is also shown
by the mean values of PORTFOLIO PL and PORTFOLIO DF. The distribution
of the portfolio size is highly skewed with median values dramatically lower than
the mean values. I expect a nonlinear effect of PORTFOLIO PL on the decision to
settle early in trial.12 It is not clear whether the differences in the characteristics
are due to selection at certain stages of trial or if they really reflect the different
patterns in settling at different stages of the trial. The origin of the plaintiff is differ-
entiated into German, European, and non-European patentees (OWNERSHIP DE
OWNERSHIP EU OWNERSHIP NEU). The shares remain relatively stable over
the groups of settlement during trial.
The dummy variable OPPOS indicates whether an opposition procedure has
taken place or not. The legal dispute is characterized by prior opposition proce-
dures. However, the numbers do not differ for suits which are settled at the first (p
= 0.262) or higher stage (p = 0.262). Whether the defendant filed an invalidity suit
12For the probability of litigation Lanjouw and Schankerman (2003) and Cremers (2004) find
that small companies have a higher risk of being involved in patent suits which appears to contradict
this result.
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at the Federal Patent Court or not is indicated by the dummy variable (NULLITY).
The last panel of Table 5.4 suggests that filed invalidity suits NULLITY as means
of defense for settlements at the second stage are more relevant compared to the
first stage. In order to characterize differences between the two District Courts I
created interaction variables OPPOSxMA, OPPOSxDUE, NULLxMA, and NULLx-
DUE. These interaction terms are chosen because I expect the differences in courts
to occur mainly through the legal instruments used prior or during trial.
5.4 Empirical Specification and Estimation Re-
sults
I argued in section 5.2.1 the parties will settle if the expected payoff of settling is
higher than the expected value of proceeding through adjudication and further to
a higher instance. I assume that the decision to settle at a certain stage of trial is
made using all available information on the patent and the court. After a new stage
is reached new settlement offers and negotiation about them are possible.
I look at the settlement decision in several ways. First, parties may or may not
settle during the trial. This is an estimation of the settlement likelihood during trial
conditional on the dispute having been selected for filing a suit.13 Second, parties
can settle before or after the pre-trial hearing at the District Court. At this point
the costs of the legal dispute are still low.14 It is not clear what kind of negotiations
or internal factors lead to the settlement. A third way of looking at the timing is
to treat the three possible instances of a civil suit in Germany as three sequential
choices of settlement or non-settlement. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2003) estimate
the probability of settlement without selection correction only in terms of whether
the parties settled before or after the pre-trial hearing. Somaya (2003) controls for
the selection of litigation from the universe of patents.
In order to estimate the determinants of settlement during trial I use a probit
13I do not investigate the settlement of patent infringement disputes before filing a suit. There
is no observable settlement rate of all disputes, because the number of detected infringements is
not known.
14Pitz (1999) reports about DM 70 000 for the first instance.
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with sample selection in order to take unobserved heterogeneity into account.15 First
there is the selection of a patent into litigation as opposed to pre-trial settlement or
lack of any controversy. The following settlement equation reflects the determinants
for the settlement after the trial has started. Both equations are written in latent
variables which are the unobserved propensity to litigate (Lit∗) and to settle (Set∗).16
Lit∗ = X1β1 + ε1 (5.1)
Set∗ = X2β2 + ε2 (5.2)
Lit∗ is a latent variable with an unknown threshold to induce filing a suit. The
other latent variable, Set∗, denotes the settlement decision during the suit. X1 and
X2 are the exogenous variables determining the latent variables. The observable
variables are litigation at all (Lit) )and subsequent settlement (Set).
Lit = 1 if Lit∗ > 0
= 0 otherwise
Set = 1 if Set∗ > 0
= 0 otherwise
I include the characteristics of the patent, the patentee and the defendant and
legal variables into these vectors. Litigation and settlement during trial may be
driven by unobserved heterogeneity and the error terms, ε1 and ε2 would thus be
correlated. I assume that the error terms are jointly distributed with a bivariate
normal distribution which leads to the supposed sample selection specification. The
resulting log likelihood function is as follows:
15See Somaya (2003) and Boyes and Low (1989).
16I also considered applying a nested logit including all outcomes of a legal patent dispute.
However, this procedure does not control for the timing of litigation. A sequential probit would be
the suitable econometric model for testing which variables influence the timing of the settlement.
However, I cannot exclude the possibility that the decision to settle at later stages of the dispute
is independent of the decision to file a suit. As argued by Waelbroeck (2004) argued the sequential
probit model depends heavily on the assumption that the unobservable variables at each stage are
not correlated.
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lnL(β1, β2, ρ) =
N∑
n=1
LitnSetn lnF (X
′
1nβ1, X
′
2nβ2; ρ)
+ Litn(1− Setn) ln
[
Φ(X
′
1nβ1)− F (X
′
1nβ1, X
′
2nβ2; ρ)
]
+ (1− Litn) ln(Φ(X ′1nβ1)).
The observations are indexed by n. F and Φ are the respective bivariate and
univariate standard cumulative normal distribution functions. The value correlates
of the patent drive the selection, not the settlement decision which determines the
exclusion restriction.
5.4.1 General Choice of Settlement During Trial
I first consider the decision to settle after the trial has started without taking account
of the stage at which the settlement has occurred. Table 5.5 contains the estimation
results.17 The selection equation shows a pattern similar to those documented in
Cremers (2004) for Germany and in Lanjouw and Schankerman (2003) for the U.S.
The higher the expected value of a patented innovation the more likely it is that
a patent will be involved in a patent litigation suit, given the patent has been in-
fringed. Stakes involved in the potential suit are highly positively correlated with the
litigation probability (CLAIMS, CIT D+E, REF D+E, FAMILY SIZE). Prior legal
steps against the patent point to a higher rate of litigation (OPPOS). If the plaintiff
has a great deal of bargaining power as manifested by a large patent portfolio, this
is negatively correlated with a patent’s probability of being litigated. Patent owners
from other countries than Germany (OWNERSHIP EU, OWNERSHIP NEU) have
a significantly lower probability of becoming involved in a litigation suit.
Columns (2) and (3) present the estimated coefficients and marginal effects of
the settlement equation within the section model. I included the value correlates
in the settlement equation. The cumulative measures of the patent value involved
in the suits appear to be insignificant for the general decision to settle during trial.
17The upper panel describes the patent characteristics, the middle part the parties characteris-
tics and the lower one the legal variables. In the last two rows ”EPO” and ”PCT” are controls for
the route of application.
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Table 5.5: Probit Estimation of Settlement in Patent Suits with Sample Selection Correction
Litigation Settlement with selection Settlement without selection
Coefficient Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AGE PATENT −0.003 −0.001 −0.004 −0.002
(0.012) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005)
CLAIMS 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002)
FAMILY SIZE 0.020∗∗ −0.012 −0.005 −0.013 −0.005
(0.008) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004)
CIT D+E 0.117∗∗∗ 0.013 0.005 0.013 0.003
(0.015) (0.031) (0.012) (0.016) (0.005)
CIT D+E SQU −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
SELF CIT 0.084 −0.119 −0.047 −0.049 −0.019
(0.151) (0.184) (0.073) (0.188) (0.074)
REF D+E 0.133∗∗∗ 0.008 0.003 0.017 0.002
(0.030) (0.049) (0.019) (0.038) (0.836)
REF D+E SQU −0.006∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
SELF REF 0.258 −0.036 −0.014 −0.068 −0.027
(0.177) (0.214) (0.085) (0.213) (0.084)
OWNERSHIP EU −0.417∗∗∗ −0.420∗ −0.166∗ −0.481∗∗ −0.190∗∗
(0.101) (0.234) (0.086) (0.206) (0.079)
OWNERSHIP NEU −0.823∗∗∗ −0.298 −0.118 −0.376∗ 0.149∗
(0.114) (0.335) (0.128) (0.223) (0.087)
LN PORTFOLIO PL −0.087∗∗ 0.146 0.058 0.175∗ 0.004
(0.043) (0.099) (0.039) (0.098) (0.009)
LN PORTFOLIO PL2 −0.002 −0.014∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
LN PORTFOLIO DF 0.035 0.014 0.024 0.019
(0.109) (0.043) (0.116) (0.018)
LN PORTFOLIO DF2 −0.002 −0.002
(0.009) (0.009)
RATIO PORTFOLIO −0.005 −0.002 −0.016 −0.006
(0.014) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006)
NULLxMA 1.039∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗
(0.318) (0.103) (0.323) (0.072)
NULLxDUE 0.479∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.049) (0.117) (0.042)
OPPOS 1.012∗∗∗
(0.110)
OPPxMA −0.493 −0.593∗ −0.227 −0.657∗∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗
(0.314) (0.322) (0.132) (0.216) (0.078)
OPPxDUE 0.044 0.018 0.007 0.019 0.008
(0.259) (0.264) (0.105) (0.122) (0.048)
EPO −0.254∗∗ −0.100 −0.040 −0.121 −0.048
(0.104) (0.138) (0.055) (0.134) (0.053)
PCT −0.477∗∗∗ 0.248 0.098 0.277 0.106
(0.183) (0.293) (0.111) (0.281) (0.103)
CONSTANT −1.128∗∗∗ 0.816 0.512
(0.160) −1.260 (1.112)
Continued on next page
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Table 5.5 – continued from previous page
LR Test of Significance for Dummy Variables - (χ2(degrees of freedom))
Technology variables 8.85(5) 3.61(4)
Ownership variables 83.47(5)∗∗∗ 6.11(2)∗∗
Relative Ownership 27.34(4)∗∗∗ 18.28(3)∗∗∗
Size variables 17.69(7)∗∗ 2.38(2)
Relative Size 29.34(11)∗∗∗
Rho (p-value) 0.012(0.528)
χ2 (DF)Prob> χ2 85.03(33) p<0.001
Pseudo R2 0.109
Observation 1648 824
Notes: The unit of observation is a single patent. The reference patent is a drug patent owned by a German
individual litigating a German individual defendant. p-value of ρ is the p statistic of the test of ρ being
significant different from zero. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at
the 10%, 5%, 1% significance level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
One exception is the number of patent claims (CLAIMS). The effect is small and
only weakly significant. I assume that a larger number of claims (CLAIMS) imposes
a higher degree of precision in the description of the patent. If this leads to more
certainty about the scope of the patent and to more confidence whether the potential
infringing action is de facto an infringement, the propensity to settle will be higher
for both parties.
I find that the probability to settle at some point during the trial is significantly
higher in cases in which an annulment claim has been filed as a means of defense. The
effect is more pronounced at the Mannheim district court (NULLxMA) compared
with Du¨sseldorf (NULLxDUE). Filing an annulment claim will raise the probability
of settlement during trial by 34 percentage points in Mannheim and by 18 percentage
points in Du¨sseldorf. This legal instrument can be regarded as a new source of
information. Furthermore it can be a signal of the strength of the defendant which
leads to a higher propensity to settle faced with the risk of loosing the patent to
the public. Only in Mannheim does an opposition procedure prior to trial have a
significant effect on settlement probability. In cases where an opposition against the
patent was filed the probability of settlement falls by 23 percentage points. Following
that, hypothesis 1 that a questionable patent is more likely to remain under dispute
until the court decides, is only supported for suits filed in Mannheim.
Controlling for technology differences I find no evidence to suggest that there is a
difference in the settlement rates. Moreover, the size dummies display no significant
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effect. But the combined effect in the selection equation and the settlement equation
is jointly significant at the 5 % level. The coefficients for the dummies indicating the
combination of domestic and foreign litigants (Relative Ownership) reveal a mixed
pattern. Taking Germans litigating against each other as the reference group, suits
where foreigners sue Germans or Germans sue foreign defendants are more likely to
be settled during trial. If there are only foreigners involved there is no significant
difference in the settlement probability.
The correlation ρ between the error terms of the two equations turned out to be
insignificant, however, the estimation specification is significant.18 Because there is
no significant correlation between the error terms of the selection equation and the
settlement during trial equation I can estimate the settlement equation separately
as shown in column (4) and (5) of Table 5.5. The probability of settlement is
determined by the set of exogenous variables X and is unconditional whether it
is selected for a suit or not. I use the same specification as in the model with
sample selection. As expected, column (4) reveals no substantial differences to
column (2). The effect of the EU- ownership (OWNERSHIP EU) is estimated more
precisely and the coefficient is larger than in the model with selection while the
coefficient of the Non-EU-ownership (OWNERSHIP NEU) emerges as positive and
significant. The estimates show a more precisely estimated negative coefficient of
the opposition procedure in Mannheim (OPPxMA). As both the conditional and
unconditional regressions in Table 5.5 display, the occurrence of a settlement at some
point during a patent litigation suit is mainly driven by the characteristics of the
parties, in particular the combination of foreign and domestic litigants. Furthermore,
the legal instruments used prior to the suit (opposition procedure) and during the
suit (annulment suit) have an impact on the course of the case and the settlement.
5.4.2 Settlement at Different Stages During Trial
Following the general discussion of the occurrence of settlement during trial Table
5.6 shows the marginal effects of probit regressions of the occurrence of settlement
18I could not find a difference with respect to treating each litigated patent as one separate suit
or investigating multi-patent suits dealing with more than one patent, which is the case in more
than one third of the cases filed (34.7%). It confirms the assumption that each patent matters in
the enforcement strategies of patent protected products.
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at different points in time of the legal suits without sample selection effects.19 First
I consider a settlement before the first oral hearing (column (1)). Second, column
(2) displays the results for settlement that occur after the first oral hearing but
still before the District Court renders an official judgement. In column (3) I con-
sider settlement during the second instance prior the ruling of the Higher District
Court. I assume that there are new decision environments at each stage. Therefore
I estimated the probability of settlement at each stage of the trial unconditional
on reaching this stage (first instance: before hearing and after hearing at District
Court, second instance: at higher court).
I discuss the estimated marginal effects of the explanatory variables comparing
the effects at all stages. The legal instruments annulment suits and opposition pro-
cedures display rather different patterns for Mannheim and Du¨sseldorf. The effect
is ambiguous for Du¨sseldorf (NULLxDUE). While the effect is positive for settle-
ments before the oral hearing it is negative after it. The changes are beneath 10
percentage points in case of an annulment suit and only significant at the 10 percent
level. During the second instance in Du¨sseldorf settlements becomes more likely by
a rate of 21.9 percentage points when an annulment suit is filed. One explanation
might be that the litigants face annulment suits which are of varying quality caus-
ing varying expectations about the probability of the patent being declared invalid
during this annulment suit. Additionally, the quality of the nullity claims becomes
apparent over time. For Mannheim (NULLxMA) I observe a clear rise in the settle-
ment probability in case of an annulment suit of 40 percentage points after the first
oral hearing. A prior opposition procedure decreases the probability of settlement
at the second instance of trial for suits originally filed in Mannheim by almost 50
percentage points (48.5), while the effect is not evident in Du¨sseldorf. It is somewhat
surprising that hypothesis 2 holds for one District Court but not the other.
The age of the patent (AGE PATENT) is only of some importance for the set-
tlement prior to the oral hearing (0.8 percentage points). Value measures such as
the number of claims and citations do not systematically affect the probability of
settlement at a certain stage. One additional claim to the average will increase the
probability of pre-hearing settlement by 0.8 percentage points which is in the same
dimension as the effect observed for the general settlement equation (See previous
19Table A5.2 in the Appendix displays the estimated coefficients.
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Table 5.6: Probit Estimation of Timing of Settlement - Marginal Effects
SETTLE
BEF HEARING DISTRICT HIGH DISTRICT
(1) (2) (3)
AGE PATENT −0.008∗∗ −0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.011)
CLAIMS 0.004∗∗∗ −0.001 0.006
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
FAMILY SIZE −0.002 −0.002 −0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
CIT D+E −0.002 −0.007 0.027∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.010)
CIT D+E SQU
SELF CIT −0.032 0.065 −0.289∗
(0.050) (0.065) (0.154)
REF D+E −0.0004 0.004 0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.020)
REF D+E SQU
SELF REF −0.149∗ 0.050 −0.081
(0.087) (0.055) (0.203)
OWNERSHIP EU 0.009 −0.088∗ −0.224
(0.057) (0.047) (0.184)
OWNERSHIP NEU 0.039 −0.002 −0.458∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.070) (0.089)
LN PORTFOLIO PL 0.012∗ −0.009 0.021
(0.007) (0.008) (0.021)
LN PORTFOLIO PL2
LN PORTFOLIO DF −0.011 0.021 −0.039
(0.013) (0.014) (0.038)
LN PORTFOLIO DF2
RATIO PORTFOLIO −0.006 0.002 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.027)
NULLxMA −0.067 0.404∗∗∗ −0.002
(0.073) (0.122) (0.301)
NULLxDUE 0.058∗ −0.065∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.078)
OPPxMA −0.027 −0.046 −0.485∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.052) (0.065)
OPPxDUE 0.011 −0.011 0.085
(0.034) (0.040) (0.096)
EPO 0.050 −0.055 0.041
(0.041) (0.038) (0.107)
PCT 0.039 0.055 0.496∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.096) (0.081)
WIN PL 0.012
Continued on next page
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Table 5.6 – continued from previous page
SETTLE
BEF HEARING DISTRICT HIGH DISTRICT
(1) (2) (3)
(0.094)
Test of Significance for Dummy Variables
LR-statistic (χ2(degrees of freedom))
Technology 1.71(4) 3.33(4) 6.42(4)
Relative Ownership 0.92(3) 4.37(3) 10.47(3)∗∗
Size variables 17.00(12) 30.09(12)∗∗∗ 25.40(12)∗∗
Pseudo-R-Squared 0.097 0.113 0.264
Obs. 824 653 272
Notes: Dependent Variable: Settlement 1/0 at a certain stage of trial. The reference patent is owned by
an Individual from Germany. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate that the parameter is
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% significance level. Standard errors in parentheses.
table 5.5, column (5)). Assuming that more claims provide more certainty about
the scope of the patent and allow a more precise evaluation of the potential in-
fringing action, settlements are more likely since both parties would have similar
expectations about the outcome of a judgement. However, the results in Table 5.6
by no means provide clear evidence to explain why this effect is the exact opposite
of more claims leading to a higher litigation rate.20 The content of the claims and
the structure might play a more important role once the suit has started.21 On
the one hand, claims might describe a patent as detailed as possible and therefore
hamper infringement and litigation by their precise description. On the other hand,
excessive claims might provide room for more infringement and hence more litigation
with less settlement.
At the second stage (column (3) of Table 5.6) received citations matter both
as a cumulative measure (CIT D+E) and as the separated measure of self citation
(SELF CIT). If CIT D-E rises by one, the probability of settlement at the second
stage goes up by 2.7 percent points. But if the owner cites its patent one more
time, the settlement at the late stage in second instance becomes less likely by 28.9
percentage points. These results suggest that value as well as strategic stakes matter
20See Table 5.5, column (1) and Cremers (2004).
21Harhoff and Reitzig (2001) analyze some aspects of strategic formulations of patent claims in
order to reach earlier issuance of patents and a higher persistence.
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while the strategic effect is more pronounced.22
The plaintiff’s portfolio size still has a positive impact on the settlement choice
before the first hearing (column (1)) which I interpret as bargaining power of the
plaintiff inducing a higher rate of agreements. An increase in the size of the portfolio
increases the probability of settlement prior to the hearing by 1.2 percentage points.
This effect is small and not observable after the first oral hearing. While the relative
size is negatively correlated with the general settlement (Table 5.5) I do not find
an impact of the size variables on the decision to settle at the pre-hearing stage
of trial. This is in line with recent findings of Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004)
who find that among other characteristics the size of the litigants do not affect
trial settlement. Additionally, the legal status of the litigants has no effect on the
outcome of the trial.
Further control variables show that in suits where the patent is owned by an
Non-EU-Foreigner the settlement probability is considerable lower (45.8 percentage
points) than for German owned litigated patents. This result is to be expected where
foreigners have borne higher costs for the suit up to this stage. However, ownership
does not play a decisive role during the earlier stages of the suit.
In Table 5.6 there is no support for the assumption that the new information
about the outcome of the first instance decision of the District Court (WIN PL)
has any impact on the settlement decision at the second instance at the Higher
District Court. Since I do not observe which party induced the settlement at the
second instance, I cannot observe whether a plaintiff who was defeated at the first
instance proceeded to the Higher District Court and then agreed to settle, or if it
was a defendant who lost at the first instance and then later forced a settlement in
the second instance. The outcome of the first instance will be used by the defeated
party to decide whether to proceed to the next instance or to drop out. However,
the propensity to settle is not influenced by the outcome of the first instance court
decision.
In neither of the stages do I find a significant correlation between the technology
and the settlement rates. It supports the earlier findings that easily accessible in-
formation is used in the decision to file a suit at the very beginning of the dispute.
22See Somaya (2003)
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Whether the litigants are foreigners or Germans is only decisive in the second in-
stance where foreign litigants are less likely to reach a settlement. Taking German
litigants solely as a reference group, in the case of a foreign plaintiff against a Ger-
man defendant the settlement probability at the second instance increases by 38.8
percentage points (SE 0.13). This is consistent with the large negative marginal ef-
fect of OWNERSHIP NEU. Highly significant after the first hearing are the dummy
variables for RELATIVE SIZE which control for the various combinations of in-
dividuals, small, medium, and large size companies as plaintiffs and defendants.
Settlement after the oral hearing is significantly more likely in cases where there is
no individual involved, neither as plaintiff or as defendant. In general, the patterns
of the determinants of settlement during several stages of the trial (Table 5.6) ap-
pear differently in early the early stage and in later stages. Observable variables for
the patent characteristics, the characteristics of the parties and the characteristics
of the two parties do not systematically have an impact on the choice of settlement
during trial.
Finally, I employed an ordered probit model to show whether settlement during
trial is commonly affected by the factors described in the prior regression. The
estimation results in table A5.3 supports the previous results. I use the stage of
settlement as the dependent variable. (No settlement (0), late settlement after
the first instance (1), settlement after hearing (2) and settlement before hearing
(3)). The number of claims appears to be correlated in a highly significant way
with early settlement. A highly significant coefficient for plaintiff’s portfolio size
pronounces the relatively weak effect which I find when applying separated probit
estimations as in Tables 5.6 and A5.2. The coefficients for annulment show that in
both District Courts earlier settlement is triggered by annulment suits. Opposition
hampers settlement during trial only in Mannheim, as the prior results suggest.
5.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter I have analyzed the determinants of settlement in patent infringe-
ment suits, using a unique data set of patent litigation suits handled in the District
Courts of Mannheim and Du¨sseldorf. Linking information about litigants and their
portfolios allows me to investigate the determinants of the outcomes of patent liti-
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gation trials.
I find that most of the settlement during trial cannot be explained by the charac-
teristics of the patent and the parties involved. This supports the assumption that
this information is symmetrically known to the parties and immediately used at the
beginning of a patent dispute. For the timing of settlement neither the absolute
nor the relative size of the plaintiff matters considerably. Only the absence of an
individual as plaintiff or defendant is a factor which leads to more settlement during
the later stages of trial.
Expectedly, the legal environment has an impact on the settlement behavior
during trial. On one hand, I find that annulment suits matter for the general
decision to settle during trial. On the other hand, suits treating patents which were
opposed appear not systematically different in their propensity to settle than those
treating non-opposed patents. However, differences between the District Courts
appear to be significant. In general, the settlement patterns differ among the District
Courts. Settlement before hearing is more frequent in Du¨sseldorf than in Mannheim
while after the hearing and in later instances the Mannheim cases are settled more
often than in Du¨sseldorf. This is at least partly due to the differently organized
oral hearings. The interpretation is limited in the respect that I cannot separate
the effect of the personal impact of the presiding judge from the decision to settle
made by the parties. Further research should concentrate more intensively on the
differences among the District Courts in their interpretation of important legal rules
and on the experience and background of the judge.
The results suggest that the parties behave rationally in the sense that all the
information about the patents and the litigants available at the beginning of the
dispute is exploited in deciding whether or not to file a suit. Additional information
emerging during trial by filing claims against validity plays a significant role in
settling during the course of the suit.
So far I regarded settlements as favorable for the parties by saving costs and
by decreasing uncertainty about property rights. Settlements are discussed in the
economic literature as a source of anti-competitive actions as well. In cases where
parties settle and agree on exclusive license contracts, patent pools and even on
mergers ((Shapiro 2001)) the danger of anti competitive actions increases. Capacity
constraints could be overcome and deter entrance of other licensees. Whether a
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settlement agreement is socially desirable or not mainly depends on the conditions
of the settlement agreement and the type of product or technology which is involved.
In the extreme case both parties hold a monopoly of substitutes which block any
other patent in this area. In order to analyze these issues in detail further research
of case study type is necessary.
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Table A5.1:Definition of Variables
Variables Definition
Dependent Variables
SETTLE TRIAL Dummy = 1 if settlement during trial at all
SETTLE DISTRICT Dummy = 1 if settlement during the first instance at District Court
SETTLE HIGH DISTRICT Dummy = 1 if settlement during the second instance at Higher District Court
SETTLE BEF HEARING Dummy = 1 if settlement before trial hearing
Exogenous Variables
Patent characteristics
AGE PATENT Age of Patent at time of filing in years from application date
CLAIMS Number of claims
FAMILY SIZE Number of jurisdictions the invention was applied for a patent
CIT D+E Number of citations received, combined at DPMA and EPO
CIT D+E SQU Number of citations received, combined at DPMA and EPO, squared
REF D+E Number of references to prior patents combined at DPMA and EPO
REF D+E SQU Number of references combined at DPMA and EPO, squared
Characteristics of the Parties
INDIV Dummy = 1 if Plaintiff is an Individual
SMALL PL Dummy = 1 if Plaintiff is a small firm
MEDIUM PL Dummy = 1 if Plaintiff is a medium size firm
LARGE PL Dummy = 1 if Plaintiff is a large firm
PERSON 0-3 Dummy = 1 if a person sues: 0-person 1-small firm 2-medium firm 3-large firm
SMALL 0-3 Dummy = 1 if a small firm sues: 0-person 1-small firm 2-medium firm 3-large firm
MEDIUM 0-3 Dummy = 1 if a medium firm sues: 0-person 1-small firm 2-medium firm 3-large firm
LARGE 0-3 Dummy = 1 if a large firm sues: 0-person 1-small firm 2-medium firm 3-large firm
PORTFOLIO PL Number of plaintiff’s patents in force at the time of filing the suit
PORTFOLIO DF Number of defendant’s patents in force at the time of filing the suit
RATIO PORTFOLIO Ratio of plaintiff’s portfolio to defendant’s portfolio
LN PORTFOLIO PL Log of plaintiff’s patents in force at the time of filing the suit
LN PORTFOLIO PL2 Log of plaintiff’s patents in force at the time of filing the suit, squared
LN PORTFOLIO DF Log of defendant’s patents in force at the time of filing the suit
LN PORTFOLIO DF2 Log of defendant’s patents in force at the time of filing the suit, squared
OWNERSHIP DE Patent owned by a German patentee
OWNERSHIP EU Patent owned by an European patentee
OWNERSHIP NEU Patent owned by a patentee from other than an European country
Variables regarding the legal dispute
Du¨sseldorf Dummy = 1: suit filed in Du¨sseldorf, = 0 if suit was filed in Mannheim
NULLITY Dummy = 1 if a nullity suit is filed after filing the infringement suit
NULLxMA Interaction Dummy: Nullity claims in suits filed in Mannheim
NULLxDUE Interaction Dummy: Nullity claims in suits filed in Du¨sseldorf
OPPOS Dummy = 1 if an opposition has been filed
OPPxMA Interaction Dummy: Opposition in Mannheim
OPPxDUE Interaction Dummy: Opposition in Du¨sseldorf
WIN Dummy = 1 if plaintiff won at District Court
EXP LEGAL COST P Expected legal costs per patent at suit
Continued on next page
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Table A5.1 – continued from previous page
Variables Definition
EXP LEGAL COST S Expected legal costs per suit
Other control variables
EPO Dummy = 1 if patent was originally applied at the EPO
PCT Dummy = 1 if patent was originally applied as a PCT application
DRUG Main technological class the patent was assigned to: Drugs and Pharma
CHEM Main technological class the patent was assigned to: Chemicals
ELEC Main technological class the patent was assigned to: Electronics
MECH Main technological class the patent was assigned to: Mechanical
OIPC Main technological class the patent was assigned to: Other technology
* Subgroup of settlements at District Court during first instance.
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Table A5.2: Probit Estimation of Timing of Settlement - Estimation Coefficients
SETTLE
BEF HEARING DISTRICT HIGH DISTRICT
(1) (2) (3)
AGE PATENT −0.031∗∗ −0.011 0.002
(0.014) (0.016) (0.027)
CLAIMS 0.016∗∗∗ −0.005 0.016
(0.006) (0.009) (0.012)
FAMILY SIZE −0.010 −0.008 −0.015
(0.011) (0.011) (0.020)
CIT D+E −0.006 −0.029 0.080∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.027) (0.030)
CIT D+E SQU −0.000 −0.000 −0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SELF CIT −0.126 0.264 −0.801
(0.201) (0.265) (0.523)
REF D+E 0.026 0.024 0.054
(0.053) (0.046) (0.074)
REF D+E SQU −0.004 −0.001 −0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
SELF REF −0.596∗ 0.203 −0.202
(0.351) (0.223) (0.509)
OWNERSHIP EU 0.035 −0.414 −0.587
(0.224) (0.262) (0.523)
OWNERSHIP NEU 0.147 −0.007 −1.532∗∗∗
(0.234) (0.287) (0.547)
LN PORTFOLIO PL 0.352∗∗∗ −0.068 0.020
(0.100) (0.139) (0.244)
LN PORTFOLIO PL2 0.027∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.003
(0.009) (0.011) (0.020)
LN PORTFOLIO DF 0.208∗ −0.043 0.094
(0.124) (0.143) (0.250)
LN PORTFOLIO DF2 0.015 −0.008 0.012
(0.010) (0.011) (0.020)
RATIO PORTFOLIO −0.024 0.008 0.013
(0.017) (0.019) (0.067)
NULLxMA −0.314 1.167∗∗∗ −0.005
(0.404) (0.313) (0.756)
NULLxDUE 0.222∗ −0.282∗ 0.555∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.165) (0.206)
OPPxMA −0.114 −0.204 −1.897∗∗
(0.266) (0.256) (0.743)
OPPxDUE 0.042 −0.046 0.214
(0.134) (0.165) (0.243)
EPO 0.191 −0.236 0.103
(0.150) (0.174) (0.268)
PCT 0.145 0.205 1.928∗
(0.305) (0.330) −1.026
WIN PL 0.030
(0.236)
Continued on next page
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Table A5.2 – continued from previous page
SETTLE
BEF HEARING after hearing first instance adopt
(1) (2) (3)
Constant −4.686 0.299 −6.260
(0.000) −1.160 (0.000)
Test of Significance for Dummy Variables
LR-statistic (χ2(degrees of freedom))
Technology 1.71(4) 3.33(4) 6.42(4)
Relative Ownership 0.92(3) 4.37(3) 10.47(3)∗∗
Size variables 17.00(12) 30.09(12)∗∗∗ 25.40(12)∗∗
Pseudo-R-Squared 0.097 0.113 0.264
Obs. 824 653 272
Notes: Dependent Variable: Settlement 1/0 at a certain stage of trial. The reference patent is owned by
an Individual from Germany. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate that the parameter is
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% significance level. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A5.3:Ordered Probit Estimation of Timing of Settlement
Settlement
AGE PATENT −0.014
(0.011)
CLAIMS 0.014∗∗∗
(0.005)
FAMILY SIZE −0.010
(0.008)
CIT D+E −0.001
(0.014)
CIT D+E SQU −0.000
(0.000)
SELF CIT 0.193
(0.233)
REF D+E 0.009
(0.032)
REF D+E SQU −0.002
(0.002)
SELF REF −0.193
(0.191)
OWNERSHIP EU −0.233
(0.173)
OWNERSHIP NEU −0.076
(0.188)
LN PORTFOLIO PL 0.252∗∗∗
(0.082)
LN PORTFOLIO PL2 0.021∗∗∗
(0.007)
LN PORTFOLIO DF 0.090
(0.097)
LN PORTFOLIO DF2 0.005
(0.008)
RATIO PORTFOLIO −0.018
(0.013)
NULLxMA 0.518∗∗
(0.232)
NULLxDUE 0.299∗∗∗
(0.099)
OPPxMA −0.387∗∗
(0.191)
OPPxDUE 0.039
(0.105)
EPO −0.007
(0.115)
PCT 0.193
(0.233)
Test of Significance for Dummy Variables
LR-statistic (χ2(degrees of freedom))
Continued on next page
Table A5.3 – continued from previous page
SETTLE
Technology 1.71(4)
Relative Ownership 0.92(3)
Size variables 17.00(12)
Pseudo-R-Squared 0.097
Obs. 824
Notes: Dependent Variable: Ordered Variable 0 no settlement, 1 settlement
after first instance, 2 settlement after hearing 3 settlement before hearing.
The reference patent is owned by an Individual from Germany. Standard
errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate that the parameter is significantly
different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% significance level. Standard errors in
parentheses.
Chapter 6
Determinants of the Duration of
Patent Trials
6.1 Introduction
Enforcement of patents in the framework of lawsuits is a time consuming undertaking
which is made in order to secure rents from an intellectual property right. First,
intellectual property rights such as patents have to be enforced in order to obtain
sustained benefits which are intended to recoup the investments in its development.
This enforcement takes time and, up to a certain limit, the duration of patent
suits has a positive implication for the efficiency of the patent system. The more
effort a litigating party invests in enforcement disputes against a potential infringer,
ceteris paribus, the longer it would take to solve the dispute. Documentary evidence
must be prepared, in some cases with the help of experts. Providing the court
with valuable and credible information delays the decision of the court as well as
settlement agreements. Second, a long lasting patent suit creates real expenditures.
Lawyer salaries or legal fees, and the loss of rents that would otherwise have been
received from exploiting the patent must also be taken into consideration.
A court decision which either provides compensation to the owner of an infringed
patent or which absolves an unjustly accused defendant is one solution to the case.
Settling on the merits of the dispute is the other. Either conclusion may be influ-
enced not only in terms of the type of outcome but also in terms of the length of time
the patent is disputed by all involved parties and the judge. Not only private but also
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social costs evolve during a time of suit. Delayed civil suit termination is regarded
as a grave economic and social problem.1 On the one hand, during the course of a
patent suit uncertainty and the loss of market share are a common sacrifice added
to the general direct costs of a patent litigation suit such as legal fees and attorney
salaries. Managerial and judicial resources are tied up. Uncertainty about the scope
of the patent reduces the expected profits from the patent and infringement directly
depletes the returns of the innovation rents. Furthermore, the expected value of the
patented invention is diminished by the risk of losing the the trial. On the other
hand, qualitatively valuable court decisions or profitable settlements disentangle the
merits of the dispute and therefore solve this uncertainty.
In addition to the private consequences of varying suit duration, society faces
additional welfare effects. Long lasting patent disputes erode incentives created by
the patent system for innovation investments. At the same time inadmissible civil
claims filed by patentees can diminish the incentives for potential competitors to
invent around or improve similar technologies. Court decisions can partly solve the
problems of the patent system which distorts market forces.2
In this Chapter, I analyze the behavior of the parties involved in patent litigation
suits with respect to the duration of the termination of the legal dispute. Based
on a model developed by Spier (1992) and adapted by Fenn and Rickman (1999),
I formulate hypotheses to explain the effect of ongoing time on the way a suit is
terminated and to link the efforts the parties make during suits to the incentives
provided by the enforcement system. In addition to the model I allow for suits to
be closed by two mutually exclusive termination events - settlement agreements and
court verdicts (adjudication). Moreover, for the investigation of the duration of both
types of termination I relate the behavior of the parties to the legal environment
and the characteristics of the patents involved in the dispute. The main findings
are that complex and multiple claim suits take longer to solve via settlement while
there is no effect on the duration of the adjudication process. Furthermore, I find
that verdicts take much longer to reach in Du¨sseldorf.
This analysis extends the existing literature on the duration of civil suits, espe-
cially patent suits by drawing on detailed information about the course of the case.
1See Vereeck and Mu¨hl (2000) and Kessler (1996).
2See Menell and Scotchmer (2005) and Scotchmer (2005) for further arguments.
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Danzon and Lillard (1983),Hughes and Snyder (1989), Kessler (1996), Spurr (1997),
Hughes and Savoca (1999) , and others empirically investigate the duration of per-
sonal civil injuries suits such as medical malpractice or car accidents. This work
mainly builds on the work of Priest (1989) and Spier (1992 and 1994) who reveal
the incentives of the parties to delay or to speed up suits. As for patent litigation
suits, Somaya (2005) and Kesan and Ball (2005) examine U.S. data to analyze the
timing of patent suits for the American system. Somaya (2005) provides a detailed
empirical investigation of both competing termination routes and finds that strate-
gic patenting behavior such as defensive strategies, exclusivity and trading aspects
have an impact on the timing of settlement or adjudication. He uses a large data
set of patent litigation to analyze patent strategies, such as blocking or fencing, and
their impact on suits. Kesan and Ball (2005) investigate a smaller data set of two
filing cohorts at a certain District Court.
Using a data set of three cohorts of filed patent litigation suits between 1993 and
1995 in Germany, described in Chapter 3, I apply a competing-risks proportional
hazard model. The estimation results reveal that for the termination of a patent
suit the direct efforts of the parties are particularly important. Settlement is delayed
by requesting an expertise and filing a large number of different litigation claims.
Annulment suits as a means of defense employed by the potential infringer delay
court adjudication but not settlement. In the data I do not find that patent strategies
as such affect the duration of one or the other outcome.
The remaining Chapter is organized as follows. In the next section I relate my
analysis to the existing theoretical and empirical work and formulate hypotheses.
Section 6.3 contains the data description. In section 6.4 I introduce the econometric
model and discuss the results. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 Theoretical and Institutional Considerations
There are two lines of research accessing the determinants of lawsuit delays. First,
models of bargaining and the sources of negotiation breakdown in different infor-
mation settings generate predictions about the driving forces of settlement delay.
Second, as soon as the patent disputes are filed to District courts they will be medi-
ated by judges. The judges’ motives and the institutional specificities also have an
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impact on the time of termination, by both settlement and verdict. In the following
I describe the results of the research lines in order to develop hypotheses for the
patent litigation trial in Germany.
6.2.1 Duration of Negotiations
In the economic literature the delay of termination of disputes is embedded in the
research of settlement behavior during negotiations (P’ng 1983, Bebchuk 1984, Nale-
buff 1987 Spier 1992). It is important to distinguish between investigations, theoret-
ical and empirical, which analyze the delay to settlement only (Fenn and Rickman
1999, Kessler 1996), those which only consider adjudication outcomes (Lanjouw and
Schankerman 2001, Nerkar A. and Paruchuri 2004) and those regarding the termi-
nation of litigation by settlement and court adjudication (Posner 1972, Priest 1989,
Spurr 1997, 2000). However, all approaches rely on the assumption that litigation
and, at later stages, court adjudication represents a failure of settlement negotia-
tions. Thus I apply the model of Fenn and Rickman (1999) which is based on the
work of Spier (1992).
A defendant decides in favor of settlement offer in each of the negotiation periods
t , t ∈ (1, T − 1) under conditions of incomplete information. The damages to
be paid by the defendant are drawn from a uniform distribution [γD, γD] with
γ > 0 as an indicator of the severity of the case. The probability of losing the
case and paying the costs C is p. Both parties discount the future at the same
rate δ ∈ (0, 1). The defendant makes settlement offers in each period in order to
minimize his expected payout and takes into account the fact that plaintiffs with a
lower type γD would have accepted earlier offers. In a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
the defendant determines the partition of the plaintiff types by a set of T settlement
offers. This partitioning is crucial for the probability of settlement in each period.
Dt = γD
1
p
δ−T
t−1∑
i=1
δiC, t = 2, ...,T (6.1)
Dt+1 = Dt +
C
p
(6.2)
In equation (6.1) the damages to be paid by the defendant are written as the
sum of the costs until the termination at time T,
∑t−1
i=1 δ
iC, times the severity of the
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infringement, γD and the probability of losing 1
p
. The benefits of settlement in an
earlier period t are written in equation (6.2) as the costs to be saved in period t+1.
The defendant’s share of benefits falls as the anticipated probability of the plaintiff
winning (higher liability of the defendant) rises. This predicts the hazard rate as a
function of the expected damages pγ∆D and the cost C of the next period. With
β = pγ∆D
C
the hazard rate of suit settlement is derived as follows:3
h(t, C, p, γ,∆D) =
(1− δ)δt−T
(1− δ)β − δ−T (δ − δt) (6.3)
β is the relation of the defendant’s expected damages ∆D and the cost C of the
next period. C would be saved by settling in the current period. Assuming that
h increases monotonically, equation 6.3 immediately leads to predictions about the
hazard rate of settlement termination by settlement agreements. First, the higher
the costs of trial the higher is the hazard rate of patent litigation suit termination by
settlement is. Second, the more severe a suit is the lower is the hazard rate of patent
litigation suit termination by settlement. The model does not explicitly predict the
hazard rates for adjudication. However, since adjudication occurs after settlement
negotiations have failed, court related activities of the litigants delay or speed up
adjudication.
In another model context developed by Admati and Perry (1987) settlement delay
may signal information about the bargaining strength of the litigants. The timing of
offers and their revision reveal information about how strong the bargaining position
is. A late settlement offer and a delayed refinement of settlement offers signal a
larger bargaining power than the litigant might actually exercise. It follows that if
the patentee thinks he has a weak patent he might prolong the time between the
offers he makes and therefore delay settlement. As a result, I expect that disclosed
bargaining power will speed up the termination of suits by adjudication.
6.2.2 Hypotheses
Based on the discussion in the previous section 6.2.1 I derive hypotheses about the
factors driving the duration of patent suits terminated by two mutually exclusive
3The detailed model is presented in Fenn and Rickman (1999).
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types of suit termination. Legal costs are closely linked to the amount at stake,
whereby high amounts lead to late settlement. This is stressed by Fenn and Rick-
man (1999) who find that a higher value of the incorporated stakes lead to lower
settlement hazards. The amount in dispute is defined by the court. Related to this
value the court fees as well as the private attorney fees are calculated.
H1 The higher the amount in dispute, the lower is c.p. the hazard rate of settlement.
In an indirect sense forgone rents of a patent in future periods are part of the
cost C. These rents are determined by the term of the patent. Thus, younger
patents will lead to a speedy adjudication since there are more years of applicability
of the rents. Somaya (2005) stresses this argument in the sense that patentees who
aiming to achieve a strategic goal of exclusivity are particularly interested in speedier
adjudication (in favor of the patentee).
The claims filed within the litigation process are a direct means to constitute the
trial. The claim for omission and demand for compensation are the regular litigation
claims filed.4 Additionally the plaintiff can demand a presentation of accounts in
order to calculate damages or to estimate restitution after unjust enrichment. Pro-
viding this information is associated with costs and a loss of reputation concerning
the internal interest of the defendant’s secrecy. In addition to the foregoing argu-
ments, it is reasonable to assume that the more claims are filed the larger is the
workload of the judges and the parties in terms of preparing the documents and the
decision.
H2 The more litigation claims are filed, the longer c.p. the patent litigation suit
lasts. The hazard rate of both settlement and adjudication termination will
be lower.
Litigants evaluate the merits of the case more closely when they request an expert
opinion. They emphasize the severity and the importance of the patent involved.
4A request for preliminary injunction forcing the defendant to refrain from all infringing activ-
ities might be followed by the collapse of the defendant’s entire business. This can be one of the
most damaging claims, particularly for small firms (Lanjouw and Lerner 2001 and Lanjouw and
Schankerman 2004). I consider this effect in analyzing the baseline hazards separated for cases
where preliminary injunctions have been requested.
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Finding evidence in these cases is more time consuming and directly delays the
termination of the suit for both types. For settlement termination, an expertise will
refine the information about the infringing action. The parties then face a different
information structure which results in a new negotiation round. Settlement will be
delayed. As far as adjudication is concerned, expert opinions speed up the decision
making process for the court and help the it to reach a decision more quickly. I
anticipate that the two effects will cancel each other out and that there will be
no correlation between the request for an expert opinion and the hazard rate for
adjudication.
H3 In cases where an expert opinion is used to find evidence the hazard rate of
settlement is c.p. lower. There is no effect of an expert opinion on the hazard
rate for adjudication.
It follows directly from the model that impatient litigants favor early settlement
and speedy adjudication since the discount of future compensations is high. Impa-
tient litigants might be individuals and small companies which have no alternative
but to tie up a relatively large amount of their resources in the litigation proceed-
ings. However, as I find in Chapter 4 and 5 individuals are more likely to become
involved in litigation in later stages than companies.
6.2.3 Court Delays and Procedural Details
Further arguments of delay in patent suit termination lie in the incentives the juris-
dictional system provides. Court delay in trials causes a delay of settlement. Kessler
(1996) and Vereeck and Mu¨hl (2000) argue that the discount of the value of the case
and the deterioration in the quality of the evidence lead to a lower propensity to
settle for the defendant which offsets the higher propensity to settle for plaintiffs.
The independence of courts is politically desirable and in many jurisdictional
systems a constitutional right.5 Nevertheless, judges at court do have private incen-
tives of their own in the sense that they also seek promotion to higher courts and to
reduce their workload. Depending on whether the capability of judges is measured
5See Landes and Posner (1975) and Salzberger (1993) ) who argue that judicial independence
is a necessary precondition if unpopular decisions are to be shifted on to judges.
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by the citations or the number of cases in which their decision have not been not
overturned by an appellate court, the judge will decide on the merits or follow prece-
dence cases. These reputation motives have been taken into account by Levy (2005)
and Miceli and Cos¸gel (1994) arguing that these motives can create conflictive de-
cision incentives. In the German litigation system an additional promotion-related
incentive for judges involves the encouragement of settlements. Judges who achieve
settlement between the litigants are regarded as capable and are therefore promoted
to higher courts more quickly or promoted to higher salary groups.6 It is clear that,
all other factors being equal, this incentive will lead to higher settlement rates. But
it is unclear whether these settlements would occur much earlier.
In Du¨sseldorf the District Court uses the first oral hearing as a procedural confer-
ence which fixes the conditions for the further negotiations. Only in the next session
does the hearing involve the merits of the case. The Mannheim court immediately
begins hearing finding evidence on the merits. I do not expect the settlement ter-
mination to have an impact on the duration of the suit. However, the adjudication
will be per se delayed. I expect that suits at the Du¨sseldorf District Court have c.p.
a lower hazard rate of suit termination by adjudication.
At this point I draw the reader’s attention to a discussion on the impact of
legal doctrines and damage paying rules on the outcome and duration of patent
litigation suits. Carpentier (2004) stresses that the punishment of delayed patent
right enforcement (doctrine of laches) may cause efficient delays the in enforcement
of patent rights to prevent overlapping suits.7 A similar finding is reported by
Schankerman and Scotchmer (2001) who evaluate the rules of damage payments
in terms of the benefits of the parties. In this context the impact of endurance is
shown as a factor affecting the length of a litigation suit as well. In cases where an
interest rate is paid for the duration of the trial the adjudication should be delayed
by the parties. The English rule which is applied in Germany forces the defeated
party to bear all the costs. This leads ex ante to higher settlement rates than
verdict drop outs ((Hughes and Savoca 1999)).8 Daughety and Reinganum (2004)
6These in-court settlement offers usually contain a lower damage payment for the defendant
and therefore lower compensation for the plaintiff but an end of the suit which is combined with
certainty and lower legal expenses.
7
8I do not consider adjudication limits. They are a restriction to the settlement delay and
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argue specifically that the use of a certain legal doctrine can produce externalities
such as delay of settlement.9 Arguments relating to the differences in the legal
procedures cannot be used in this analysis given that, in the German system, there
is no significant difference among the courts in applying these rules.
6.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
I use a sample of all patent litigation suits filed during the time period between 1993
and 1995, as described in Chapter 3. From all 652 suits filed at the two District
Courts, Mannheim and Du¨sseldorf, 306 suits remained in the sample for the analysis
duration. Suits for which the date of termination did not appear correctly as the
real end of the dispute had to be excluded.10. Additionally, some of the litigation
claim variables were not available or had been incorrectly observed. I tested whether
there is a selection bias for the most important exogenous variables and found that
those cases were not significantly different in their means.
174 suits were closed by settlement either before court or out of court.11 Court
adjudications terminated suits in 132 cases. Appeals are included in the sample.
Vereeck and Mu¨hl (2000) condense the time of a trial into four periods: First,
the negotiation time between the discovery of the infringement and filing a suit;
second, the time between the decision to file and clarification of the administrative
requirements in preparation for the trial; third, time between filing the suit and
the start of the trial; fourth, the duration of the trial up to its termination by a
settlement agreement, a court decision or the case being dropped. In this analysis I
combine the third and fourth periods and define it as the duration of a patent suit
reduce the duration endogenously.
9Djankov et al. (2003) measure the procedures at courts in several countries and find that the
level of formalism affects the duration of trials. But this is more of importance when comparing
national systems of enforcement.
10Especially in Du¨sseldorf, closing dates are reported which lie after the end of the decision
about the merits
11For the researcher there is no distinction observable between a settlement agreement with
compensation payment (e.g license fees, damages) and a drop. For all out of court settlements there
are no data available for compensation payments or changes or stop in the potentially litigating
action (Shavell 2003).
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and regard the time from filing the letter of claims to the District Court until the
final notification of the end of the trial as the duration of the suit which is in this
case also the duration of the trial.
Settlement takes on average 30 days longer than termination by court decision
(Table 6.1). Independent of whether the suit has been terminated by settlement or
by adjudication, suits in Du¨sseldorf last on average almost 9 months longer than at
the Mannheim District Court. In both District Courts the average duration of trials
differ, but not significantly, according to type of termination.
Table 6.1: Time Length of Suits by Kind of Termination and District Court
Termination at Mannheim at Du¨sseldorf Total Obs.
Mean Mean Mean
by (SD) (SD) (SD)
Adjudication 366.85 662.97 517.15 133
(432.41) (534.84) (507.50)
Settlement 399.51 632.17 540.72 173
(571.22) (478.37) (527.69)
Total 383.55 644.17 530.52
(506.50) (499.81) (518.33)
Observation 134 172 306
Table 6.2 shows the means and standard errors of most exogenous variables ex-
plaining the duration of patent suits in Germany which were closed either by set-
tlement or by court decision. The first panel displays the variables describing the
characteristics of the suit. Plaintiff’s activities are measured as the number of litiga-
tion claims (LIT CLAIMS) filed and the request for an expert opinion (EXPERT).
EXPERT is coded as an indicator variable defining whether an expert opinion was
requested or not. Defendants’ efforts are recorded in terms of whether they file
an annulment suit (DUMMY NULLITY) at the Federal Patent Court (BpatG). In
cases where the defendant requested a stay after filing an annulment, the duration
of the stay (DURATION OF STAY) is longer prior to settlement if the suit is closed
by settlement rather than court adjudication. Patent characteristics are shown in
panel two of table 6.2. There are more patent claims (CLAIMS) involved in suits
which terminate with settlement rather than in those which were adjudicated. The
higher value of AMOUNT IN DISPUTE for settled cases is in line with this finding
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Table 6.2: Description of Main Exogenous Variables According to Type of Termination, Mean (SD)
Full Sample Settlement Adjudication
DURATION OF STAY (days) 79.18 105.431 44.58 ∗∗
(281.86) (317.19) (223.55)
LITIGATION CLAIMS 2.79 2.86 2.70
(1.65) (1.61) (1.71)
EXPERTISE 0.16 0.13 0.20 ∗∗
DUMMY STAY 0.14 0.18 0.09 ∗∗
DUMMY NULLITY 0.25 0.30 0.17 ∗ ∗ ∗
DUMMY HEARING 0.83 0.84 0.80
AMOUNT IN DISPUTE (in Mio DM) 0.68 0.83 0.47 ∗
(1.97) (2.58) (0.47)
OPPOSITION 0.27 0.23 0.32 ∗
CLAIMS 9.98 10.73 8.99 ∗
(9.20) (10.75) (6.54)
SELF REFS 0.02 0.03 0.015
(0.14) (0.15) (0.12)
SELF CITES 0.04 0.03 0.04
0.24 (0.16) (0.32)
REFERENCES 3.88 3.90 3.87
(3.39) (3.37) (3.44)
CITATIONS 4.17 3.90 4.53
(5.59) (4.70) (6.56)
FAMILY SIZE 4.85 4.43 5.40 ∗∗
(5.08) (5.07) (5.05)
PATENT AGE 9.05 9.10 8.97
(4.25) (4.08) (4.47)
PORTFOLIO RATIO 0.54 0.47 0.63
(5.38) (5.04) (5.81)
PORTFOLIO PL 623.21 583.64 675.37
(5382.45) (5048.16) (5813.08)
PORTFOLIO DF 205.45 197.47 215.97
(1383.41) (1086.80) (1701.71)
INDIVIDUAL 0.31 0.27 0.36 ∗
Observations 306 174 132
Notes: The Table shows the means of the main exogenous variables. ∗, ∗∗,
∗∗∗
indicate that
the means of the sub samples settlement and adjudication differ significantly at the 10%, 5%,
1% significance level. Standard errors in parentheses.
since the AMOUNT IN DISPUTE is correlated with the number of patent claims.12
12The numbers correspond to those in table 5.4 in the previous Chapter.
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6.4 Competing Risk Analysis
In the following section I present the competing risk analysis of patent suit termi-
nation by settlement and termination by court adjudication.
6.4.1 Econometric Model and Estimation Techniques
For the competing risk analysis of the duration of patent litigation suits I use a semi-
parametric, proportional hazard model. Termination of the suits can happen by one
of two mutually exclusive events. I distinguish between settlement agreements S
as one termination event and court adjudication A as the second termination event
(Hughes and Savoca, Somaya 2000). Termination occurs at time T and is observable
at the T S and TA for each suit. T is defined as T = min(T S, TA). Following the
Cox model two type-specific hazards are estimated in the stratified version of the
proportional hazard model (Cox 1972). I assume that the two types are mutually
independent. From this assumption, it follows that the observable hazard function
equals :
hc(t;X = x) = lim
∆t→0
P
(
t ≤ T c < t+∆t|t ≤ T = min (T S, TA) , X = x)
∆t
(6.4)
A result of the independence assumption is that I can estimate the hazards for
each type in a single-risk model where the suits are terminated by competing risks
(or types) of termination.
hc(t) = exp(−β′X)h0(t)) where c ∈ S,A (6.5)
X refers to the exogenous determinants influencing the hazard rates. It reflects
the legal strategies the plaintiff and the defendant use to solve the dispute as well
as the general characteristics of the patent involved.
Similar to Somaya (2005) and Kessler (1996) I apply this approach to avoid the
determination of a time dependency of the hazard function up front. I can take into
account the possibility that the baseline hazard rate may have a non-monotonic
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distribution with decreasing and then increasing time dependency or vice versa.13
12 Empirical findings on suit duration in civil law are mixed as far as the distribution
of the hazard rate is concerned.14 I estimate baseline hazard function for each type
of termination by stratifying the sample type of trial used - normal suit or request
for preliminary injunction. In order to account for time varying variables such as
annulment suits and time of suspension I report robust standard errors which are
calculated using the variance-covariance estimator of Lin and Wei (1989). Since the
sample includes only cases which were completed at the time of data collection (End
of 1999 until Spring 2000) I introduce a downward finite sampling horizon bias.15
6.4.2 Estimation Results
The baseline hazards are displayed in figure 6.1. I applied a Kaplan-Meier estima-
tor for the calculation according to the model in equation 6.5. All hazards reveal
nonlinear patterns for settlement and adjudication. The overall hazard function for
both types of suit termination (Graph A) appears differently from the separated
hazards for settlement and court adjudication (Graph B). Settlement hazards do
not vary much over time but drop sharply after about 5 years.
The hazard functions of suit termination by settlement and adjudication are
deviating considerably between Du¨sseldorf (Graph C) and Mannheim (Graph D). In
Du¨sseldorf the hazard function of adjudication is always below the settlement hazard
function. Cases in Du¨sseldorf always have a higher hazard of being terminated by
settlement than by adjudication. The hazards in both cases increase up to a duration
of about 4 years for settlement and 5 years for adjudication. After a duration of 5
years the hazards decrease while suits are subject to a greater hazard of termination
by adjudication. This pattern suggests that there might be an adjudication limit
13(In her model of strategic bargaining Spier (1992) predicts a U-shaped distribution with
decreasing and then increasing time dependency of the hazard function in pre-trial negotiations.
14Fenn and Rickman (1999) found a monotonically increasing baseline hazard in their analysis
of clinical negligence and employee claims while Kessler (1996) reports a declining baseline hazard
in a study of the settlement of automobile bodily injury insurance claims.
15The share of unfinished suits is estimated by the judges at somewhat under 2 per cent.
Following Scherer and Harhoff (2000) who stress the general skewed distribution of value parameters
in the universe of patents, I presume that long lasting suits may involve very specific patents.
However, evidence was not provided within the case documents because of confidentiality.
6.4 Competing Risk Analysis 106
Figure 6.1: Baseline Hazard Functions
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which forces the court to decide on unfinished cases after a duration of more than 5
years.
In Mannheim the hazard rate for settlement is higher than in Du¨sseldorf up
to a duration of 2 years while it increases within the first year of suit duration
only to decrease sharply thereafter. If the suit lasts longer than two years, the
settlement hazard in Mannheim does not fit any particular pattern. Adjudication
hazards increase and then decrease again after 3 years. The results for Du¨sseldorf
suits mainly confirm the prediction of the model. Settlement hazards increase over
time. The adjudication hazards follow this course at a lag of a few months. The
settlement hazards in Mannheim have completely different characteristics. These
differences are probably due to differences in the oral hearing systems in Mannheim
and Du¨sseldorf.
Table 6.3 shows estimated covariate effects for settlement termination and adju-
dication. I tested two model specifications. In the first model I included only the
variables which explain the active efforts of the parties and the court discrimination
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variable. In the second model I tested legal activities together with patent and party
characteristics as control variables.
In the first model (Model 1) I estimate the hazard rates of termination by set-
tlement and by adjudication corresponding to the hypotheses in sections 6.2.1 and
6.2.3. I assume that the duration of a trial is driven by the efforts parties invest
in enforcing the intellectual property right or determining infringing actions. The
AMOUNT IN DISPUTE is the value the court attaches to the patent under dispute.
I only find an effect on the settlement or on the adjudication type of termination
when I control for the patent and patentee characteristics (Model 2). Settlement is
prolonged by a higher AMOUNT IN DISPUTE. This result confirms hypothesis 1.
The hazard rate for adjudication is larger than one and thus indicates that court
decisions are reached more quickly if the value of the patent involved appears to be
high and the costs involved in the suit are higher.
The number of litigation claims filed at the beginning of the suit (LIT CLAIMS)
is an indicator of the severity of the potential infringement. The coefficient of
LIT CLAIMS is less than one and significant at the 5 per cent significance level.
This is in line with hypothesis 2. However this effect vanishes if the control variables
for patent and litigant characteristics are included. Requesting an expert opinion
(EXPERTISE) has a large and significant negative impact on the hazard ratio in
the settlement equation. The information revealed by the expert’s report resets the
information basis and probably discloses the type of infringement and the strength
of the patent. As hypothesis 3 states, termination by settlement is delayed by
requesting an expert’s opinion. As expected, no effect on the adjudication hazard
is observed.
The indicator variable DU¨SSELDORF is coded one if the suit was filed at the
Du¨sseldorf District Court and zero if it was filed in Mannheim. In the adjudication
equation of Model 1 for DU¨SSELDORF the coefficient is smaller than one which
tells us that the hazard rate of adjudicated trials is lower in Du¨sseldorf compared to
Mannheim. This is in line with my expectations. The coefficient of DU¨SSELDORF
represents the differences between the personalities of the judges and their experi-
ence and capability of interpreting the law. Applying Model 1 I find no effect for
DU¨SSELDORF in the settlement equation. The duration of an adjudicated suit is
significantly slowed down by the fact that it is filed in Du¨sseldorf. Contrary to the
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Table 6.3: Hazard Rate Model Estimates by Kind of Suit Termination
Model 1 Model 2
Settlement Adjudication Settlement Adjudication
AMOUNT IN DISPUTE1 0.967 1.056 0.931∗ 1.091∗∗
(0.026) (0.041) (0.036) (0.047)
LIT CLAIMS 0.892∗∗ 1.021 0.923 0.996
(0.050) (0.071) (0.065) (0.077)
EXPERTISE 0.399∗∗∗ 0.926 0.338∗∗∗ 1.137
(0.097) (0.230) (0.083) (0.326)
DUMMY STAY 0.554∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.109) (0.111) (0.106)
DUMMY NULLITY 0.988 0.632∗ 0.943 0.621∗
(0.192) (0.165) (0.186) (0.178)
DUMMY HEARING 0.496∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.113) (0.144) (0.090)
DU¨SSELDORF 1.096 0.547∗∗∗ 0.875 0.628∗
(0.204) (0.111) (0.212) (0.158)
OPPOSITION 0.807 0.535∗
(0.191) (0.189)
OPPxMA 0.277∗∗ 1.839
(0.159) (0.866)
CLAIMS 0.998 0.957∗∗
(0.010) (0.018)
REFERENCES 0.992 1.032
(0.025) (0.026)
CITATIONS 0.978 1.010
(0.016) (0.012)
FAMILY SIZE 0.944∗∗ 1.013
(0.024) (0.024)
PATENT AGE 0.991 0.977
(0.028) (0.030)
PORTFOLIO RATIO 0.999 1.003
(0.013) (0.014)
PORTFOLIO PL 1.011 1.069
(0.044) (0.048)
PORTFOLIO DF 1.002 0.902∗∗
(0.045) (0.043)
INDIVIDUAL 0.982 1.333
(0.199) (0.301)
Wald-statistic (χ2(degrees of freedom))
Ownership Indicator − − 1.55(2) 1.80(2)
Relative Ownership − − 7.52(3)∗ 4.60(3)
Observations 306 306 306 306
log Likelihood −743.29 −525.95 −723.64 −512.36
Notes: The Table shows the estimation results of the Cox proportional hazard-rate models.
The reference suit is a case filed by a German company against a German company. ∗,
∗∗,
∗∗∗
indicate that the parameter is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1%
significance level. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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results displayed in figure 6.1, Graph C and D, I do not find the difference in the
hazard function in the pattern between Mannheim in Du¨sseldorf to be significantly
different.16
Variables which describe legal means which are used during trial and which
directly influence the course of the case are the filing an annulment suit
(DUMMY NULLITY), a request for a suspension after filing an annulment suit
(DUMMY STAY), and the holding of a hearing (DUMMY HEARING). These are
tested to ascertain whether they influence both types of patent suit termination.
In cases where a hearing is conducted the coefficients are significantly smaller than
one, which indicates a lower hazard rate. A filed annulment suit has no effect on
the hazard rates of the settlement equation, either in Model 1 or in Model 2. How-
ever, adjudication is delayed by an annulment suit which is indicated by a lower
hazard rate. The effect remains weakly significant over the two model specifica-
tions. The fact that the defendant applies for a suspension of the litigation suit
while the annulment case is pending lowers the hazard rate significantly for both
types of termination however. This is straightforward because the suspension time
adds directly to the duration of the suit.
In columns three and four of table 6.3 I control for several patent and party
characteristics (Model 2). Whether a patent has been involved into an opposition
procedure (OPPOSITION) leads to a decrease in the hazard rate for adjudication
termination. . Even though the effect is only weakly significant, it may indicate that
primary questionable patents are either more important and therefore worth fighting
for or that the scope of the patent is still not defined conclusively. Both arguments
lead c.p. to longer adjudication delays. Similar to results in Chapter 5 I can only
show an effect of prior opposition for the Mannheim District court suits. Case evi-
dence strongly supports in-court settlements at the Mannheim District Court. This
is in line with a higher in-court settlement rate in Mannheim.17 In cases in which
prior legal steps have been taken, such as opposition, these settlements are harder to
achieve in Mannheim, even though the settlement hazard does not significantly dif-
fer between the District Courts. The coefficient of the number of claims (CLAIMS)
is significant lower than one in the adjudication equation. Although more patent
16The specification of the Cox proportional hazard model leads to different results compared to
the Kaplan-Meier estimator when considering other covariates.
17See Table 5.1 in section 5.3.
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claims define the scope of the patent more precisely, they make it more complicated
to produce evidence and may end up delaying court decision. This confirms the
result that a large number of litigation claims do not delay the decision of the judge
because he is more familiar with them compared to the patent claims. Patent claims
are different for each patent and cause more specific attention of the judge.
The length of settlement negotiations during trial is not strongly affected by
the patent value. Only the number of jurisdictions where the patent was applied
for (FAMILY SIZE) has a significant negative impact on the hazard rate of settle-
ment termination. While the number of references made to prior patents (REFER-
ENCES) or received by subsequent patent application at the German or European
Patent Office (CITATIONS) are strong indicators for patent value, they do not show
significant coefficients for the hazard rates in either kind of suit termination. This
result differs from the findings of Somaya (2005) who reports a smaller hazard rate
for citation in the settlement equation. Neither do I find any evidence that the
portfolio size ratio has an impact on the hazard rates in the settlement equation.
However, for adjudication the portfolio size of the defendant (PORTFOLIO DF) re-
veals a coefficient smaller than one indicating that the hazard rate for adjudication
is smaller for those defendants compared to the baseline hazard. This is a surpris-
ing result bearing in mind that portfolio size is often interpreted as technological
strength linked to bargaining power.18 This bargaining power is mainly brought to
bear in settlement negotiations. However, at this very last stage of negotiations in
court parties may fail to settle more often in cases where the defendant has a large
portfolio size and thus adjudication will close the suit, but very late. Summing up,
the competing risk analysis reveals that the links of patent characteristics to the suit
termination by settlement differ from those to the adjudication termination. These
differences reflect different underlying decision rules.
6.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter I analyze the determinants of patent suit termination in the two
District Courts of Mannheim and Du¨sseldorf. While the theoretical literature mainly
concentrates on the duration of negotiations which are terminated by settlement I
18See Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001, 2003, 2004) and related studies.
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distinguish between suit termination by mutual settlement agreements and court
adjudication. This Chapter complements and expands related work by Somaya
(2005) for U.S. data on patent litigation suits and Fenn and Rickman (1999) on
health care negligence suits. I included information on the litigation claims and the
means used by the parties to solve or delay the termination of the suit which are
particular for the German system. I found significant differences in the determinants
between the factors influencing the delay of court adjudication and settlement.
The hazard rate for the settlement hazard decreases with the complexity of the
case. As for adjudication termination, neither a large number of filed litigation
claims nor a request for expert’s reports significantly delays the duration of the case.
Only direct means of delay such as a suspension of the suit after filing an annulment
case reduce the hazard rate for both types of patent suit closures. Adjudication
hazard is found to be generally lower in cases where an opposition procedure has
been filed prior to the litigation suit. Questionable patents remain questionable in
the long run or attract greater interest from potential imitators. However, settlement
hazards are only lower for cases in Mannheim which faced a prior opposition.
The amount in dispute is defined by the court and indicates, on the one hand
the expected value of the patent and, on the other hand, the legal costs related to
this value. These two types of termination have opposite effects on the hazards.
While hazards are lower for settlement the hazards for adjudication increase with
the amount in court. This result indicates that higher costs speed up adjudication.
If settlement is reached, the costs are divided beneficially for both parties and not
simply borne by the defeated party.
Delayed suit termination increases the costs of plaintiffs disproportionately to the
increased benefits they enjoy. This and increased public cost are socially harmful.
It has not been unambiguously proven, however, that policies introduced to reduce
the duration of suits lead to a socially beneficial result. As Priest (1989) and Posner
(1972) argue along with Spurr (2000) (1997, 2000), who empirically tested for med-
ical malpractice trials in the U.S., delay reduction programs reduce the time of suit
termination in the short run but lead to an increase in the number of cases filed.
Assuming no change in the infringement rates, more cheap suits would be filed.
One limitation of the analysis is the short time period to which available data
relates. Court congestion and cases with the same patents certainly have an impact
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on the length of patent suits. I have not discussed whether a settlement agreement
is socially beneficial. Settlement agreement may lead to a license contract and
subsequently to collusive behavior. The consequences are not welfare enhancing
as long as there is no anti-trust policy incorporated ((Shapiro 2003)). This is even
exaggerated by very long trials. Furthermore, the static view of the social effects of a
delay of court decisions clearly shows that the social effects of long trials are negative
in terms of the court costs borne by the public purse and in terms of the uncertainty
of trial outcomes. In ”a more than one period world” the demand for cases would
decrease because the plaintiff’s private litigation costs would increase with the court
delay. The assumption that the two types of suit termination are independent is
crucial for the competing risk analysis. However, introducing adjudication deadlines
into the model may violate this assumption. Taking this problem of correlation of
hazards into account will be the subject of future research.
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